Page:Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology (1870) - Volume 1.djvu/354

Rh 336 ARISTOTELES. considered apart from its particular contents ; it is treated quite as a form, and the remark is at the same time made, that for that very reason it as yet supplies us with no knowledfje (eTTio-TTj/xTj). But because this abstract universal possesses greater facilities for subjective cognition, Aristotle makes the doctrine of the syllogism precede that of j>roof^ for according to him, proof is a particular kind of conclusion. {Anal. pr. i. 4.) Accordingly, together with the mode of its formation, he treats of the figures of the syllogism, and the different forms of conclusion in them. (cc. 1 — 27.) Then he gives directions for finding with ease the syllogistic figures for each problem that is proposed (fUTropeu'), and lastly shews how to refer given conclusions to their principles, and to arrange them according to premises. Thereupon, in the second book of the Analytics, he treats of the complete conclusion according to its peculiar determining principles {Anal. ii. 1 — 15), points out errors and deficiencies in concluding (cc. 16— 21), and teaches how to refer to the syllogistic figures incomplete argu- ments, which have for their object subjective con- viction only. (cc. 22 — 27.) We do not arrive at that conclusion which is the foundation of knowledge till we arrive at proof i. e. a conclusion conveying a distinct meaning {(rvWoyiariJLds imai^fioviKos, diroSei^is), which proceeds from the essential definitions of the matter in question. Proof, in order to lead to objective truth, necessarily presupposes prin- ciples. Without an acquaintance with princi- ples, we cannot attiiin to knowledge by means of proof. Aristotle, therefore, treats first of the na- ture of principles. They are the Universal, which selves as a medium through which alone we can attain to knowledge ; they have their certainty in themselves, and are not susceptible of any additional separate proof. In this point of view Aristotle compares them with the immediate certainty of sensuous perceptions. The reason {vovi) and the exertion of the reason {v6t}(Tis), which is itself the Universal, develops these principles {dpx<is) out of itself. In proof we may distinguish three things : 1. That which is proved {Anal. post. i. 7), i. e. that which is to pertain to some definite object {yevd rivi) considered in itself. 2. The principles from which this is deduced. 3. The object, the attributes of which are to be exhibited. According to their subject-matter, proofs come into closer relation to the particular sciences. Here the im- portant point is, to know what science is more accurate, and may be presupposed as the ground- work of another {ivporfpa Icti). The knowledge to which proof conducts by means of principles (eTT/o-T^^Tj) has for its object necessary existence ; conception (5(^|o), on the other hand, has for its object that which may be otherwise constituted. After Aristotle, in the first book of the second Analytics, has shewn how by means of proof we may receive a knowledge thai something is, and u-hj/ it is so, he considers that which we cannot get at by means of proof, but which is necessary for the complete development of our ideas, viz. the defini- tion of that which is substantial, by means of which we have stated what an object is. This is effected by definition {6pi(Tfx6s). The definition states what the essence of a thing is, and is therefore always universal and affirmative. It cannot be proved by any conclusion, nor even be demonstrated by ARISTOTELES. j means of induction. {Anal. post. ii. 7.) We find out the essence of a thing only when we know the essential attributes of the thing, and its existence itself. Aristotle analyses the different kinds of definition (.4«a/. joos^ ii. 10), then treats of the individual causes (for the definition declares the why of a thing with reference to its essence), and lastly lays down the method of finding a correct definition. {Anal. post. ii. 11, &c. ii. 13.) The ob- ject of definition is, to comprehend the whole ac- cording to its essential differences, and to refer these again to the genus, in order by these means to bring under contemplation the whole as a unity consisting of mutually connected and dependent members. One aid in definition is subdivision {Sialpecris). The definition must be clear and dis- tinct. This distinctness is attained by endeavour- ing first to define the particular, in order to become acquainted with the import of it in every species. The use of definition is especially important in proposing problems. {Anal. post. ii. 14.) Aristotle, however, does not, either in his Meta- physics, or in the particular sciences, proceed ac- cording to the abstract forms of conclusion, as he develops them in the Organon ; but the definition {ogiaiiids) forms the central point in the further prosecution of his philosophical investigations. He forms his conception of the idea of a thing (to tI i^u ehai) in the identity of its existence and essence^ and so continually points out the universal in the particular. VII. Metaphysics. The first philosophy (for such is the name Aris- totle gives to what we call Metaphysics) is the science of the first principles and causes of things. {Met. ii. 3, 4.) It is theoretic science, and the most excellent, but at the same time the most difficult of all sciences, because its object, the uni- versal, is removed as far as possible from the per- ceptions of the senses. {Met. i. 2.) It is, however, at the same time the most accurate science, because its subject-matter is most knowable ; and the most free, because it is sought solely for the sake of knowledge. There are four first causes or principles of things: a. The substance and the idea (t; ovaia /col ro ri riv elvai) ; b. The subject and the matter (77 v) Kal t6 VTTOKeiixevov) ; c. The principle of motion {Seev r apxh rrjs Kiin^aews) ; (/. The purpose and the good (to o5 ej/e/ca koJ rd di,ya66v). The earlier philosophers (this Aristotle shews in the first book of the Metaphysics) recognized indeed all these classes singly, but neither distinctly nor in connex- ion. With full consciousness he declares, after having developed the history of metaphysics from the Ionian philosophers to Plato in bold and mas- terly outlines, that this science of the first philoso- phy had up to his time resembled a lisping child (t^eAifo^e»/7?, Met. i. 10, p. 993, Bekk.;. The consciousness of the opposition between truth existing in and for itself, and the cognition of it, must necessarily be presupposed in all philo- sophizing. This consciousness, which has come out in all its distinctness only in the philosophy of the most recent times, Aristotle also possesses. But he has it in the form of doubts (ctTropiat), which rise against science itself and its definitions. These doubts and questions, then, Aristotle considers on all sides, and therefrom arrives at the following result : —