Page:Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology (1870) - Volume 1.djvu/353

Rh ARISTOTELES. ifi that which is eternal, fundamental, whilst the single object, fashioned so as to assume an indivi- dual existence is produced, and perishes. The ma- terial in which the negation is inherent, is the potentiality {Suua/xis), out of which the formative principle, as an entelecheia, fashions itself into ex- istence. This, as the full reality (4v4pyeia), is the higher step in opposition to the mere potentiality. According to these definitions, the Aristotelian philosophy progresses genetically from the lower to the higher, from the Svvaixis to the eVreAexem of that, of which the potential, according to its pecu- liarity, is capable. Thus by means of the (XStj* the universe becomes a whole consisting of mu- tually connected members, in which these ftdr] attain to full existence. In inorganic nature the purpose is still identical with the necessity of the matter ; but in organic nature it comes into exist- ence as the soul of the enlivened object {^vxv). The energy (ivefyyfia) of the soul is, as an entele- cheia, tlwught^ both vovs TTaQi]TiK6s, since, as the temporary activity of the mind, it is necessarily dependent on the co-operation of the senses, and vovs TronTiK6s, i. e. cognoscent, self-acting reason, in so for as, in the pure element of thought freed from what is sensuous, it elevates the finite world into cognoscible truth. From this exalted point of view Aristotle regjirded and subjected to inquiry the entire empire of reality and life, as it had developed itself up to his time in science, arts, and politics. VI. Aristotelian Logic. Aristotle is the creator of the science of logic. The two deepest thinkers of Germany, Kant and Hegel, acknowledge that from the time of Aris- totle to their own age logic had made no progress. Aristotle has described the pure forms and opera- tions of abstract reason, oi finite thought, with the accuracy of an investigator of nature, and his logic is, as it were, a natural history of this " finite thought." Aristotle obtains the categories, the fundamen- tal conceptions of thought, from language, in which these universal fonns of thought appear as parts of speech. These categories {KarTryopiai, also Kariry- opi^fj-ara, ra Karrj-yopovfieva) give all the possible definitions for the different modes in which every- thing that exists may be viewed; they are the most universal expressions for the relations which constantly recur in things ; fundamental definitions, which cannot be comprehended under any higher generic conception, and are, therefore, called yevij. Yet they are not themselves generic conceptions, which give what is essential in an object, but the most universal modes of expressing it. An inde- pendent existence belongs to ovcria, substance, alone of all the categories ; the rest denote only the different modes of what is inherent. The categories themselves, therefore, are not an ultima- tum, by means of which the true cognition of an object can be attained. The most important pro- position in Aristotle's doctrine of substances + is, that " the universal attains to reality only in the individual" {firi ovarwu odu rwv irpwruv ovcriwu dSvparov tuiv dWav ri ilvai). ARISTOTELES. 335 is the external form itself. t The TrpojTTj ovffia expresses the essential qua- lities only, the Seurcpat ovaiai are substances, in- cluding both essential and accidental qualities. After 8uhsta7iee {ovala) Aristotle first treats of quantity, which with that which is relative attaches to the material of the substance, then passes to what is qualitative, which has reference especially to the determination of the form of the object. (In the Metaphysics on the other hand (v. 15), where the categories are defined more in accordance with our conceptions of them, the in- vestigation on the qualitative precedes that on the relative.) The six remaining categories are treated of only in short outlines. The object of the categories is, to render possi- ble the cognition of the enormous multiplicity of phaenomena ; since by means of them those modes of viewing things which constantly recur in connexion with existence are fixed, and thus the necessity for advancing step by step ad infinitum is removed. But in Aristotle's view they are not the ultimatum for cognition. They rather denote only the differ- ent modes in which anything is inherent in the substance, and are truly and properly determined only by means of that which is substantial. This again is determined by the elSos, which is what is essential in the material, and owes its existence to the purpose of the thing. This purpose, and nothing short of this, is an ultimatum for cognition. The highest opposition in Avhich the purpose realises itself is that of Zvvayiis and ti'TeAex^ia. (Arist. de Anima, ii. c. 1.) The categories are singh words (to dvev (rvfi- TroKj]s AeyojjLfva). As such, they are in them- selves neither true nor false. They become both only in the union of ideas b}- means of mutual reference in a proposition (ret Kard (Tv}jL7roKriv Aeyofieva). A proposition is the expression (ep/xT^vfia) of reflecting thought, which separates and combines (^Siatpeais, tn/jUTrXo/o;). This opera- tion of thought manifests itself first of all in judg- ment. In this way Aristotle succeeds in advan- cing from the categories to the doctrine of the ex- pression of thought (ep/iTiVeto). Here he treats first of all of the component elements of the pro- position, then of simple propositions, together with the mode of their opposition with reference to the true and the false; lastly, of compound propositions [at (Tv/jLTrKeKo/xevai dTrocpdvcreis), or modal forms of judgment (at dirocpdvaeis /.lerd Tporrov), out of which the category of modality was afterwards formed. In the second part of the treatise irepl fp/jLTjueias the different modes of opposition of both kinds of propositions are discussed. The essence of judg- ment, which presents itself in a visible form in the proposition, consists in this, that the idea, which in itself is neither true nor false, separates itself into the momenta peculiar to it, the universal, the particular, the individual, and that the relation be- tween these momenta is either established by means of affirmation, or abolished by means of negation. Judgment, however, stands in essential relation to conclusion. In judgment. Universal and Parti- cular are referred to each other; these two mo- menta of our conceptions separate themselves, with reference to the conclusion, into two premises (^irpordcreis), of which the one asserts the universal, the other the particular. {Anal. pr. i. 25 ; to ^ikv (is vou, TO Se US fiepos.) The conclusion itself, however, is that expression, in which, from certain premises, something else beyond the premises is necessarily deduced. But the conclusion is still
 * elSos is the internal formative principle; ft6p<pr}