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Rh  and Date.—There is no independent external evidence for the authorship of this work; but there is no reason whatever to doubt that, as its inscription informs us, it is from the pen of Athenagoras. It closely agrees with the Apology in style and thought, and all that has been said above of the internal evidence for the genuineness of the former work applies equally to this. That such a treatise was in Athenagoras's mind when he wrote the Apology appears from the words near its close, c. 36, p. 39, "let the argument upon the Resurrection stand over"; from which words we may not unfairly gather that the Treatise on the Resurrection shortly followed the former work. This is the only clue to its date which we possess. From the closing sentences of c. 23 (p. 66 ) it seems that it was intended as a lecture. "We have not made it our aim to leave nothing unsaid that our subject contained, but summarily to point out to those who came together what view ought to be taken in regard to the Resurrection" must allude not merely to a few friends who might happen to be present when the book was read, but to a regular audience. From a reference, c. 1. p. 41, to an occasional mode for arranging his arguments, it may be supposed that Athenagoras was in the habit of delivering public lectures upon Christianity. The arrangement, too, and peculiar opening of the treatise decidedly favour the view that it was a lecture, somewhat enlarged or modified for publication.

Analysis.—The work consists of two parts: (i) The removal of the objections (1) that God wants the power (2) or the will to raise the dead. (1) He does not want the power to do it, either through ignorance or weakness—as Athenagoras proves from the works of creation; defending his positions against the philosophic objections, that the bodies of men after dissolution come to form part of other bodies; and that things broken cannot be restored to their former state. (2) God wants not the will to raise the dead—for it is neither unjust to the raised men, nor to other beings; nor unworthy of Him—which is shewn from the works of creation. (ii) Arguments for the Resurrection. (1) The final cause of man's creation, to be a perpetual beholder of the Divine wisdom. (2) Man's nature, which requires perpetuity of existence in order to attain the true end of rational life. (3) The necessity of the Divine judgment upon men in body and soul, (a) from the Providence, (b) from the justice of God. (4) The ultimate end of man's being, not attainable on earth.

III. Athenagoras as a Writer.—To most of the apologists Athenagoras is decidedly superior. Elegant, free from superfluity of language, forcible in style, he rises occasionally into great power of description, and his reasoning is remarkable for clearness and cogency; e.g. his answer to the heathen argument, that not the idols, but the gods represented, are really honoured. His treatment of the Resurrection is for the most part admirable. Even where the defective science of the day led him into error, e.g. in answering the question, apparently so difficult, as to the assimilation of the materials of one human body into another the line taken is one that shews

no little thought and ability; and his whole writings indicate a philosophic mind, which amply justifies the title given to him in the inscription of his two works.

His style, however, is not unfrequently somewhat obscured by difficult elliptic or parenthetical passages, and anacolutha (for examples of which see the Apology, c. 1, p. 2 ; c. 20, p. 19 ; c. 22, p. 23 ; and de Resurr. c. 18, p. 60 ). Among his peculiar words and phrases, Clarisse notices his use of ἄγειν in the sense of ducere, to think, and τὰ ἐπισυμβεβηκότα Θεῷ for the attributes of God.

IV. His Philosophy.—Mosheim represents Athenagoras as having been the first of the Eclectics. It is far more true to say that he shared in the eclecticism which then pervaded all philosophy. That he had been a Platonist appears, on the whole, from his continual reference to Plato and the thoroughly Platonic view which on many points pervades his works. We easily recognize this view in his language about matter and the souls, angels, natures sensible and intelligible, and the contemplation of God as the end of man's being; and also in that referring to the Son of God as the Logos and Creator (except that this is not at all peculiar to Athenagoras), more especially in his calling the Word "idea (or archetype) and energy" in the work of Creation. He also appears to allude slightly to the doctrine of reminiscences (de Resurr. c. 14, p. 55 ). The Platonism of Athenagoras was modified, however, by the prevailing eclecticism (cf. e.g. the Peripatetic doctrine of the mean, so alien to Plato, Resurr. c. 21, p. 64 ), and still more, of course, by his reception of Christianity, which necessitated the abandonment of such views as the unoriginated nature of the soul. With all this agrees excellently so much of Philippus Sidetes's account as connects Athenagoras with the Academics; whose Platonism was precisely such as is here described. Allusions to the other philosophers are abundant; e.g. to Aristotle and the Peripatetics, Apol. c. 6, p. 7 ; c. 16, p. 15 ; to the Stoics, ib. c. 6, p. 7 ; to the Cyrenaics and Epicureans, Resurr. c. 19, p. 62. We see from Apol. c. 7, p. 8, that he regarded the Gentile philosophers as possessing some measure of Divine light in their minds, but unable thereby to come to the full knowledge of God, because this could only be obtained by revelation, which they never sought.

V. Theology, etc.—Athenagoras's proof of the Divine unity rests on the propositions, expressed or implied, that God is perfect, self-existent, uncompounded; the Creator, Sustainer, and Ruler of the universe. Were there more gods than one, they could not co-exist and co-work as a community of beings similar to each other, in the same sphere; for things self-existent and eternal cannot be like a number of creatures formed all on one pattern, but must be eternally distinct and unlike. They could not be parts of one whole, for God has no parts. There could be no place for another God in connexion with this universe, for the Creator is over and around His own works. Another God, confined to some other universe of his own, could not concern us; and so would be but a finite being.

The Son of God.—In God, since He is an 