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NTSB interrupted, and their attention was momentarily diverted. Studies have shown people are vulnerable to forgetting to resume interrupted tasks in a timely manner. When they do resume the interrupted task, they may struggle to mentally reconstruct the point at which they were interrupted, and they are vulnerable to increased errors.

Therefore, the NTSB concludes that the Amtrak engineer accelerated the train to 106 mph without slowing the train for the curve at Frankford Junction, due to his loss of situational awareness, likely because his attention was diverted to the emergency situation with the SEPTA train.

1.4.2 Need for Improved Crew Training and Advanced Technologies
This accident, along with those discussed above, illustrates that a crewmember's prolonged focus on one area of train operations can take attention away from other critical operations, including those to be performed in the near future. To address this type of situation (and as a result of the 2003 Metra accident discussed in section 1.4.1), the NTSB recommended that Metra— "Use locomotive engineer simulator training to go beyond basic skills and teach strategies for effectively managing multiple concurrent tasks and atypical situations (R-05-11)"

The NTSB also recommended that the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)—

"Develop guidelines for locomotive engineer simulator training programs that go beyond developing basic skills and teach strategies for effectively managing multiple concurrent tasks and atypical situations. (R-05-9)."

The FRA contracted for a research study on this topic. Based on the results of that research, a training course was developed by the contractor that teaches strategies to locomotive crews for managing distractions and the importance of sustained attention on the locomotive operating task. The training material is available to the industry for purchase, but there is no requirement for railroads to incorporate this training material into their training programs. Both recommendations are classified "Closed—Acceptable Action."

Many railroads, including Amtrak, have incorporated distraction management into their training programs. The engineer of train 188 received Amtrak's distraction management training. However, the Amtrak training could be expanded to more effectively address prolonged, atypical 11