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14 87 Fed. Reg. 61512–61514. And to the extent that the Department’s decision to adopt the Plan under the HEROES Act might have some incidental effect on the likelihood that the Department will undertake a separate loan-forgiveness program under a different statute, the relationship is not sufficiently close to persuade us that the latter is fairly traceable to the former. See, e.g., Simon, 426 U. S., at 42–43 (accepting that certain tax rules might “ ‘encourag[e]’ ” or “ ‘discourage’ ” particular behavior, but nonetheless holding that connection to be insufficient to establish standing where it was “just as plausible” that actors would “forgo favorable tax treatment”). Moreover, no one argues that the existing references to one-time relief are legally binding. To whatever extent the Department has determined that the Plan crowds out other efforts to forgive student loans, that, too, is a discretionary and independent decision that respondents may ask it to reconsider with a §553(e) petition.

Finally, Brown and Taylor also argue that they have demonstrated causation because the Secretary’s failure to observe the requisite procedural rules cost them a “ ‘chance’ ” to “obtain debt forgiveness.” Brief for Respondents 28. But referring in the abstract to a “chance” of obtaining “debt forgiveness” does not solve their problem. They do not want debt forgiveness under the HEROES Act, which they claim is unlawful. They want debt forgiveness under the HEA. Nothing the Secretary has done deprives them of a “chance” to seek that result.

Because respondents cannot meaningfully connect the absence of loan relief under the HEA to the adoption of the Plan, they have failed to show that their injury is fairly traceable to the Plan.

For these reasons, respondents lack standing, and we therefore vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand the case with instructions to dismiss. By vacating