Page:Department of Education v. Brown.pdf/14

10 to see how such an injury could be particular (since all people suffer it) or concrete (since an as-yet-uncreated benefits plan is necessarily “ ‘abstract’ ” and not “ ‘real’ ”). Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. 330, 340 (2016); see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 755–756 (1984) (rejecting a theory that would “extend [standing] nationwide”). Nor have we ever accepted that an injury is redressable when the prospect of redress turns on the Government’s wholly discretionary decision to create a new regulatory or benefits program.

Nonetheless, we think the deficiencies of respondents’ claim are clearest with respect to traceability. They cannot show that their purported injury of not receiving loan relief under the HEA is fairly traceable to the Department’s (allegedly unlawful) decision to grant loan relief under the HEROES Act.

At the outset, we reiterate what respondents’ claim is not. Respondents are not claiming that they are injured by not being included in the Plan (or, in Taylor’s case, by being remunerated by the Plan less generously than he thinks himself entitled to). After all, they think the Plan is substantively unlawful, a merits contention that “we accept as valid” for purposes of analyzing standing. Federal Election Comm’n v. Ted Cruz for Senate, 596 U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (slip op., at 6). It would be quite strange to think that a party experiences an Article III injury by not being affected by an unlawful action (in Brown’s case) or not being more affected by such action (in Taylor’s).

Instead, respondents seek relief under a separate statutory source. They name the HEA as that potential source, but presumably they would be pleased for the Department