Page:Dennis Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP.pdf/18

Rh , concurring.

I join the Court’s opinion, which makes a coherent whole of a thorny section of statutory text. I write separately to make two observations: First, this is a close case, and today’s opinion does not prevent Congress from clarifying this statute if we have gotten it wrong. Second, as the Court makes clear, “enforcing a security interest does not grant an actor blanket immunity from the” mandates of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U. S. C. §1692 et seq. See ante, at 13–14.

This case turns on two sentences that, put together, read in relevant part: "“[1] The term ‘debt collector’ means any person… in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts…. [2] For the purpose of section 1692f(6) of this title, such term also includes any person… in any business the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security interests.” §1692a(6)."

As the Court recognizes, if the first sentence were the only text before us, nonjudicial foreclosure plainly would qualify as debt collection–after all, foreclosure itself “is a means of collecting a debt,” ante, at 7, whether “directly or