Page:Denard Stokeling v. United States.pdf/18

Rh it does not, then the statute is too broad to qualify as a “violent felony.” In determining what a state crime covers for purposes of this federal sentencing enhancement, federal courts look to, and are constrained by, state courts’ interpretations of state law. See id., at 138.

As relevant here, Florida law defines robbery as “the taking of money or other property… from the person or custody of another… when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear.” Fla. Stat. §812.13(1) (2017). The Florida Supreme Court has interpreted the statute’s reference to force to require “force sufficient to overcome a victim’s resistance.” Robinson v. State, 692 So. 2d 883, 887 (1997). Otherwise, the “degree of force used is immaterial.” Montsdoca v. State, 84 Fla. 82, 86, 93 So. 157, 159 (1922). If the resistance is minimal, the force need only be minimal as well.

Florida robbery, as interpreted and applied by the Florida courts, covers too broad a range of conduct to qualify as a “violent felony” under the ACCA. Both the text and purpose of the ACCA–particularly as they have already been construed by our precedents–demonstrate why.

In considering the text of the ACCA, we do not write on a clean slate. As everyone seems to agree, the key precedent here is this Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 559 U. S. 133. See ante, at 3, 8. But while the majority claims to honor Johnson, ante, at 8–10, it does so in the breach.

Johnson concerned whether Florida battery qualified as an ACCA predicate under the elements clause. This Court held that it did not. To arrive at that answer, the Court was required to interpret what exactly Congress meant