Page:Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire vol 6 (1897).djvu/114

 94 THE DECLINE AND FALL The invention of the Greek fire did not, like that of gun- powder, produce a total revolution in the art of war. To these liquid combustibles the city and empire of Constantinople owed their deliverance ; and they were employed in sieges and sea- fights with terrible effect. But they were either less improved or less susceptible of improvement ; the engines of antiquity, the catapultae, balistae, and battering-rams, were still of most fi'equent and powerful use in the attack and defence of fortifica- tions ; nor was the decision of battles reduced to the quick and heavy ,^;r of a line of infantry, whom it were fruitless to protect with armour against a similar fire of their enemies. Steel and iron were still the common instruments of destruction and safety ; and the helmets, cuirasses, and shields of the tenth century did not, either in form or substance, essentially differ from those which had covered the companions of Alexander or Achilles.'^" But, instead of accustoming the modern Greeks, like the legionaries of old, to the constant and easy use of this salutary weight, their armour was laid aside in light chariots, which followed the march, till, on the approach of an enemy, they resumed with haste and reluctance the unusual incum- brance. Their offensive weapons consisted of swords, battle- axes, and spears ; but the Macedonian pike was shortened a fourth of its length, and reduced to the more convenient measure of twelve cubits or feet. The sharpness of the Scythian and Arabian arrows had been sevei'ely felt ; and the emperors lament the decay of archery as a cause of the public misfortunes, and recommend, as an advice and a command, that the military youth, till the age of forty, should assiduously practise the exercise of the bow.^* The bauds, or regiments, were usually thi'ee hundred strong ; and, as a medium between the extremes of four and sixteen, the foot-soldiers of Leo and Constantine were formed eight deep ; but the cavalry charged in four ranks, from the reasonable consideration that the weight of the front could not be increased by any pressure of the hindmost horses. If the ranks of the infantry or cavalry were sometimes doubled, this cautious array betrayed a secret distrust of the courage of ^'•^See the fifth, sixth and seventh chapters, n-fpl oTrAwr, Trcpl nn-Atcrfw^ and Trtpi yvixv- airirK;. in the Tactics of Leo, with the corresponding:; passages in those of Constantine. [On the organization and tactics of the Byzantine army see Mr. Oman's Art of War, ii. Bk. iv. chaps, ii. and iii.] TToWa vvv eliue-; a-j? yap roftia? nal'TeM<; <i/j.e'r)f)n'(Ty)9 . . . e'r Toi? 'Ptofiai'Ofi tol