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Rh where the Muscovites had maintained themselves without interference during the winter.

Soon after the beginning of the siege the grand vizier conceived a grand plan, which if successful would have ended the campaign and driven the Russians to the north of the Danube. His idea was to overwhelm the Russians in detail, first by recapturing Pravadi with its garrison, and then moving on the force investing Silistria, together with the covering army, which was commanded by General Diebitsch in person. With this object in view the grand vizier on the 28th of May marched out of Shumla at the head of thirty-six thousand men, leaving only a feeble garrison to hold the place. General Roth, who commanded the Russians at and near Pravadi, strengthened the garrison with two battalions, and then retired about twenty miles to the northward with ten thousand men. At the same time he despatched an officer with news of the movement of the Turks, telling him to ride as for life or death. The officer covered the distance of eighty miles in twelve hours without changing his horse. The Turks arrived in front of Pravadi on the 1st of June, and sat down leisurely with the intention of taking the place in their own convenient time. Pravadi stands in a narrow valley at the foot of the Balkans, and is a place of great natural strength, so that an assault was quite inadvisable. Immediately on hearing of the Turkish movements General Diebitsch determined to move by forced marches with the covering army near Silistria, and also with a part of the besieging force, and check the plans of the grand vizier, which he learned through an intercepted letter to Hussein Pasha. By the 5th of June, he was in motion with twenty thousand men, leaving General Krassowski to continue the siege of Silistria and prevent reinforcements reaching the garrison. This explains the weakness of the besiegers during their operations against the fortress. Diebitsch's plan was to move against the grand vizier's