Page:Decisive Battles Since Waterloo.djvu/371

Rh wing was not so well protected, as it had no fortification to rest upon. It is generally believed that Marshal Bazaine was still confident of escaping with his army from Metz. He was ready for an attack, and hoped that the superiority of his position, the destructive fire of his artillery, small-arms, and machine guns would be able to repel the enemy, and bring him victory. As soon as this was accomplished the time would be propitious for making his retreat. The entire arrangement of the French for the battle of the 18th was purely a defensive one, and in no manner did they intend to make it offensive. The strictest orders were issued to the corps commanders not to advance, but to retain their positions as long as possible, no matter how great might be their loss. The German armies well understood that the battle must be an offensive one, and fought under great disadvantages of position. A concentration had been made in such a manner as to afford the greatest possible celerity in supporting any parts of the line that might be in danger. Briefly summarized, the positions were as follows: At Mars-la-Tour, the Prussian Guards and 12th corps, with cavalry between them. Between Trouville and Vionville, the 3d and 10th corps, with 5th and 6th cavalry divisions. South of Rezonville, the 9th and 8th corps, with first cavalry division. Between Bois des Ognons and Bois des Vaux, the 7th corps, forming the right wing. At Ars-sur-Moselle, the 26th infantry brigade.

The two contingencies for which the Germans were prepared were, first, that the French might try to retire on the 18th by the northern road; and, secondly, that they might accept a battle close to the walls of Metz, and with their rear in the direction of the German frontier. King William issued a general order on the afternoon of the 17th as follows: