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Rh a campaign which was to give the Northern States a taste of the horrors of war. Hitherto the fighting had all been on Southern soil, but now it was to be carried straight into the heart of Pennsylvania, amid the rich farms and prosperous towns of that sober commonwealth. Instead of waiting for the Army of the Potomac under Fighting Joe Hooker to attack him, Lee proposed to dodge it, and to push forward towards Maryland by the valley of the Shenandoah. If he could conceal his movements for some time from the national army he might be able to get well on his way before efficient measures could be taken to oppose him. His plan was to detain the Union army before Fredericksburg by a large display of troops, then to turn its right wing and push up the Shenandoah Valley under cover of the Blue Ridge Mountains. He had a veteran army on which he could depend, its effective force being some 80,000 men, of whom 68,352 were infantry. This was about the strength of the army under Hooker. The armies were thus equal, but Lee had one great advantage, he had absolute authority and could do what he saw was best at the moment, while Hooker was continually hampered by orders from Washington. On June 3d Longstreet's 1st division moved forward into the Wilderness, and the other divisions followed closely, until on the evening of the 7th, the 1st corps had reached the neighborhood of Culpepper Court-House. Ewell's 2d corps started in the same direction on the 4th. Gen. A. P. Hill's 3d corps was the only one left to occupy the positions where the army had passed the winter, and it had to string out very thinly in order to conceal the departure of two thirds of the army. These great movements could not entirely escape the attention of the Unionists, but they were at a loss to know what was on foot. Hooker believed that Lee intended to resume the campaign of the preceding year.