Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v5.djvu/451

1787.] , Connecticut, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, no, 5; Georgia, divided.

Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS moved to insert, after "office," "except offices in the army or navy; but, in that case, their offices shall be vacated."

Mr. BROOM seconds him.

Mr. RANDOLPH had been, and should continue, uniformly opposed to the striking out of the clause, as opening a door for influence and corruption. No arguments had made any impression on him but those which related to the case of war, and a coexisting incapacity of the fittest commanders to be employed. He admitted great weight in these, and would agree to the exception proposed by Mr. Gouverneur Morris.

Mr. BUTLER and Mr. PINCKNEY urged a general postponement of article 6, sect. 9, till it should be seen what powers would be vested in the Senate, when it would be more easy to judge of the expediency of allowing the officers of state to be chosen out of that body.

A general postponement was agreed to, ''nem. con.''$207$

Article 6, sect. 10, was then taken up, "that members be paid by their respective states."

Mr. ELLSWORTH said that, in reflecting on this subject, he had been satisfied that too much dependence on the states would be produced by this mode of payment. He moved to strike it out, and insert, "that they should be paid out of the treasury of the United States an allowance not exceeding ——— dollars per day, or the present value thereof."

Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS remarked, that, if the members were to be paid by the states, it would throw an unequal burden on the distant states, which would be unjust, as the legislature was to be a national assembly. He moved that the payment be out of the national treasury, leaving the quantum to the discretion of the national legislature. There could be no reason to fear that they would over-pay themselves.

Mr. BUTLER contended for payment by the states, particularly in the case of the Senate, who will be so long out of their respective states that they will lose sight of their constituents, unless dependent on them for their support.

Mr. LANGDON was against payment by the states. There would be some difficulty in fixing the sum, but it would be unjust to oblige the distant states to bear the expense of their members, in travelling to and from the seat of government.

Mr. MADISON. If the House of Representatives is to be chosen biennially, and the Senate to be constantly dependent on the legislatures, which are chosen annually, he could not see any chance for that stability in the general government, the want of which was a principal evil in the state governments. His fear was, that the organization of the government, supposing the Senate to be really 54