Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v5.djvu/393

1787.] he observed, would be probably of his own state, the other two of some other states; and as probably of a small as a large one.

Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS liked the idea; suggesting, as an amendment, that each man should vote for two persons, one of whom at least should not be of his own state.

Mr. MADISON also thought something valuable might be made of the suggestion, with the proposed amendment of it. The second-best man in this case would probably be the first in fact. The only objection which occurred was, that each citizen, after having given his vote for his favorite fellow-citizen, would throw away his second on some obscure citizen of another state, in order to ensure the object of his first choice. But it could hardly be supposed that the citizens of many states would be so sanguine of having their favorite elected, as not to give their second vote with sincerity to the next object of their choice. It might, moreover, be provided, in favor of the smaller states, that the executive should not be eligible more than ——— times in ——— years from the same state.

Mr. GERRY. A popular election in this case is radically vicious. The ignorance of the people would put it in the power of some one set of men, dispersed through the Union and acting in concert, to delude them into any appointment. He observed that such a society of men existed in the order of the Cincinnati. They are respectable, united, and influential. They will, in fact, elect the chief magistrate in every instance, if the election be referred to the people. His respect for the characters composing this society could not blind him to the danger and impropriety of throwing such a power into their hands.

Mr. DICKINSON. As far as he could judge from the discussions which had taken place during his attendance, insuperable objections lay against an election of the executive by the national legislature; as also by the legislatures or executives of the states. He had long leaned towards an election by the people, which he regarded as the best and purest source. Objections, he was aware, lay against this mode, but not so great, he thought, as against the other modes. The greatest difficulty, in the opinion of the House, seemed to arise from the partiality of the states to their respective citizens. But might not this very partiality be turned to a useful purpose? Let the people of each state choose its best citizen. The people will know the most eminent characters of their own states; and the people of different states will feel an emulation in selecting those of whom they will have the greatest reason to be proud. Out of the thirteen names thus selected, an executive magistrate may be chosen either by the national legislature, or by electors appointed by it.

On a question, which was moved, for postponing Mr. Pinckney's motion, in order to make way for some such proposition as had been hinted by Mr. Williamson and others, it passed in the negative.

Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, ay, 5; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no, 6.