Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v5.djvu/381

1787.] people, the same pleas would je equally valid in favor of a partial compact, founded on the consent of the legislatures.

Mr. WILLIAMSON thought the resolution (the nineteenth) so expressed, as that it might be submitted either to the legislatures or to conventions recommended by the legislatures. He observed that some legislatures were evidently unauthorized to ratify the system. He thought, too, that conventions were to be preferred, as more likely to be composed of the ablest men in the states.

Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS considered the inference of Mr. Ellsworth from the plea of necessity, as applied to the establishment of a new system on the consent of the people of a part of the states, in favor of a like establishment on the consent of a part of the legislatures, as a non sequitur. If the Confederation is to be pursued, no alteration can be made without the unanimous consent of the legislatures. Legislative alterations not conformable to the federal compact would clearly not be valid. The judges would consider them as null and void. Whereas, in case of an appeal to the people of the United States, the supreme authority, the federal compact may be altered by a majority of them, in like manner as the constitution of a particular state may be altered by a majority of the people of the state. The amendment moved by Mr. Ellsworth erroneously supposes, that we ire proceeding on the basis of the Confederation. This Convention is unknown to the Confederation.

Mr. KING thought with Mr. Ellsworth that the legislatures had a competent authority, the acquiescence of the people of America in the Confederation being equivalent to a formal ratification by the people. He thought with Mr. Ellsworth, also, that the plea of necessity was as valid in the one case as the other. At the same time, he preferred a reference to the authority of the people, expressly delegated to conventions, as the most certain means of obviating all disputes and doubts concerning the legitimacy of the new Constitution, as well as the most likely means of drawing forth the best men in the states to decide on it. He remarked, that, among other objections made in the state of New York to granting powers to Congress, one had been, that such powers as would operate within the states could not be reconciled to the Constitution, and therefore were not grantable by the legislative authority. He considered it as of some consequence, also, to get rid of the scruples which some members of the state legislatures might derive from their oaths to support and maintain the existing constitutions.

Mr. MADISON thought it clear that the legislatures were incompetent to the proposed changes. These changes would make essential inroads on the state constitutions; and it would be a novel and dangerous doctrine, that a legislature could change the constitution under which it held its existence. There might indeed be some constitutions within the Union, which had given a power to the legislature to concur in alterations of the federal compact. But there were certainly some which had not; and, in the case of these, a ratification