Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v5.djvu/268

242 Mr. GORHAM moved to fill the blank with "six years," one third of the members to go out every second year.

Mr. WILSON seconded the motion.

Gen. PINCKNEY opposed six years, in favor of four years. The states, lie said, had different interests. Those of the Southern, and of South Carolina in particular, were different from the Northern. If the senators should be appointed for a long term, they would settle in the state where they exercised their functions, and would in a little time be rather the representatives of that, than of the state appointing them.$141$

Mr. READ moved that the term be nine years. This would admit of a very convenient rotation, one third going out triennially. He would still prefer "during good behavior;" but being little supported in that idea, he was willing to take the longest term that could be obtained.

Mr. BROOM seconded the motion.

Mr. MADISON. In order to judge of the form to be given to this institution, it will be proper to take a view of the ends to be served by it. These were,—first, to protect the people against their rulers; secondly, to protect the people against the transient impressions into which they themselves might be led. A people deliberating in a temperate moment, and with the experience of other nations before them, on the plan of government most likely to secure their happiness, would first be aware, that those charged with the public happiness might betray their trust. An obvious precaution against this danger would be, to divide the trust between different bodies of men, who might watch and check each other. In this they would be governed by the same prudence which has prevailed in organizing the subordinate departments of government, where all business liable to abuses is made to pass through separate hands, the one being a check on the other. It would next occur to such a people, that they themselves were liable to temporary errors, through want of information as to their true interest; and that men chosen for a short term, and employed but a small portion of that in public affairs, might err from the same cause. This reflection would naturally suggest, that the government be so constituted as that one of its branches might have an opportunity of acquiring a competent knowledge of the public interests. Another reflection equally becoming a people on such an occasion, would be, that they themselves, as well as a numerous body of representatives, were liable to err, also, from fickleness and passion. A necessary fence against this danger would be, to select a portion of enlightened citizens, whose limited number, and firmness, might seasonably interpose against impetuous counsels. It ought, finally, to occur to a people deliberating on a government for themselves, that, as different interests necessarily result from the liberty meant to be secured, the major interest might, under sudden impulses, be tempted to commit injustice on the minority. In all civilized countries the people fall into different classes, having a real or