Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v5.djvu/225

1787.] marked our affairs, was too serious to permit any scruples whatever to prevail over the duty imposed on every man to contribute his efforts for the public safety and happiness. He was obliged, therefore, to declare himself unfriendly to both plans. He was particularly opposed to that from New Jersey, being fully convinced that no amendment of the Confederation, leaving the states in possession of their sovereignty, could possibly answer the purpose. On the other hand, he confessed he was much discouraged, by the amazing extent of country, in expecting the desired blessings from any general sovereignty that could be substituted. As to the powers of the Convention, he thought the doubts started on. that subject had arisen from distinctions and reasonings too subtle. A federal government he conceived to mean an association of independent communities into one. Different confederacies have different powers, and exercise them in different ways. In some instances, the powers are exercised over collective bodies; in others, over individuals, as in the German Diet, and among ourselves, in cases of piracy. Great latitude, therefore, must be given to the signification of the term. The plan last proposed departs, itself, from the federal idea, as understood by some, since it is to operate eventually on individuals. He agreed, more over, with the honorable gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Randolph,) that we owed it to our country to do, on this emergency, whatever we should deem essential to its happiness. The states sent us here to provide for the exigencies of the Union. To rely on and propose any plan not adequate to these exigencies, merely because it was not clearly within our powers, would be to sacrifice the means to the end. It may be said, that the states cannot ratify a plan not within the purview of the Article of the Confederation providing for alterations and amendments. But may not the states themselves, in which no constitutional authority equal to this purpose exists in the legislatures, have had in view a reference to the people at large? In the senate of New York, a proviso was moved, that no act of the Convention should be binding until it should be referred to the people and ratified; and the motion was lost by a single voice only, the reason assigned against it being, that it might possibly be found an inconvenient shackle.

The great question is, what provision shall we make for the happiness of our country? He would first make a comparative examination of the two plans, prove that there were essential defects in both, and point out such changes as might render a national one efficacious. The great and essential principles necessary for the support of government are—1. An active and constant interest in supporting it. This principle does not exist in the states, in favor of the federal government. They have evidently in a high degree, the esprit de corps. They constantly pursue internal interests adverse to those of the whole. They have their particular debts, their particular plans of finance, &c. All these, when opposed to, invariably prevail over, the requisitions and plans of Congress. 2. The love of power