Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v5.djvu/153

1787.] violated; and perhaps nothing better could be obtained, from the jealousy of the states with regard to their sovereignty.

He then proceeded to enumerate the defects:—

First, that the Confederation produced no security against foreign invasion; Congress not being permitted to prevent a war, nor to support it by their own authority Of this he cited many examples; most of which tended to show that they could not cause infractions of treaties, or of the law of nations, to be punished; that particular states might, by their conduct, provoke war without control; and that, neither militia nor drafts being fit for defence on such occasions, enlistments only could be successful, and these could not be executed without money.

Secondly, that the federal government could not check the quarrel between states, nor a rebellion in any, not having constitutional power, nor means, to interpose according to the exigency.

Thirdly, that there were many advantages which the United States might acquire, which were not attainable under the Confederation; such as a productive impost, counteraction of the commercial regulations of other nations, pushing of commerce ad libitum, &c., &c.

Fourthly, that the federal government could not defend itself against encroachments from the states.

Fifthly, that it was not even paramount to the state constitutions, ratified as it was in many of the states.

3. He next reviewed the danger of our situation; and appealed to the sense of the best friends of the United States—to the prospect of anarchy from the laxity of government every where — and to other considerations.

4. He then proceeded to the remedy; the basis of which, he said, must be the republican principle.

He proposed, as conformable to his ideas, the following resolutions, which he explained one by one.

"1. Resolved, that the Articles of Confederation ought to be so corrected and enlarged as to accomplish the objects proposed by their institution; namely, 'common defence, security of liberty, and general welfare.'

"2. Resolved, therefore, that the rights of suffrage in the national legislature ought to be proportioned to the quotas of contribution, or to the number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may seem best in different cases.

"3. Resolved, that the national legislature ought to consist of two branches.

"4. Resolved, that the members of the first branch of the national legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several states every ——— for the term of ———; to be of the age of ——— years at least; to receive liberal stipends, by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to the public service to be ineligible to any office established by a particular state, or under the authority of the United States, except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the first branch, during the term of service, and for the space of ——— after its expiration; to be incapable of reelection for the space of ——— after the expiration of their term of service, and to be subject to recall.

"5. Resolved, that the members of the second branch of the national legislature ought to be elected, by those of the first, out of a proper number of persons nominated by the individual legislatures; to be of the age of ——— years at least; to hold their offices for a term sufficient to insure their independency; to receive liberal stipends, by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to the public service; and to be ineligible to any office established by a particular state, or under the authority of the United States, except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the second branch, during the term of service, and for the space of ——— after the expiration thereof.

"6. Resolved, that each branch ought to possess the right of originating acts; that the national legislature ought to be empowered to enjoy the legislative rights vested in Congress by the Confederation, and moreover to legislate in all cases to which the separate states are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation; to negative all laws passed by the several states contravening, in the opinion of the national legislature, the Articles of Union, or any treaty subsisting under the authority of the