Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v5.djvu/134

108 Let it have a negative, in all cases whatsoever, on the legislative acts of the states, as the king of Great Britain heretofore had. This I conceive to be essential, and the least possible abridgment of the state sovereignties. Without such a defensive power, every positive power that can be given on paper will be unavailing. It will also give internal stability to the states. There has been no moment, since the peace, at which the federal assent would have been given to paper money, &c. &c.

Let this national supremacy be extended also to the judiciary department. If the judges in the last resort depend on the states, and are bound by their oaths to them and not to the Union, the intention of the law and the interests of the nation may be defeated by the obsequiousness of the tribunals to the policy or prejudices of the states. It seems at least essential that an appeal should lie to some national tribunals in all cases which concern foreigners, or inhabitants of other states. The admiralty jurisdiction may be fully submitted to the national government.

A government formed of such extensive powers ought to be well organized. The legislative department may be divided into two branches—one of them to be chosen every ——— years by the legislatures, or the people at large; the other to consist of a more select number, holding their appointments for a longer term, and going out in rotation. Perhaps the negative on the state laws may be most conveniently lodged in this branch. A council of revision may be superadded, including the great ministerial officers.

A national executive will also be necessary, I have scarcely ventured to form my own opinion yet, either of the manner in which it ought to be constituted, or of the authorities with which it ought to be clothed.

An article ought to be inserted expressly guaranteeing the tranquillity of the states against internal as well as external dangers.

To give the new system its proper energy, it will be desirable to have it ratified by the autliority of the people, and not merely by that of the legislatures.

I am afraid you will think this project, if not extravagant, absolutely unattainable, and unworthy of being attempted. Conceiving it myself to go no farther than is essential, the objections drawn from this source are to be laid aside, I flatter myself, however, that they may be less formidable on trial than in contemplation. The change in the principle of representation will be relished by a majority of the states, and those too of most influence. The Northern States will be reconciled to it by the actual superiority of their populousness; the southern by their expected superiority on this point. This principle established, the repugnance of the large states to part with power will in a great degree subside, and the smaller states must ultimately yield to the predominant will. It is also already seen by many, and must by degrees be seen by all, that, unless the Union be organized efficiently on republican principles, innovations of a much more objectionable form maybe obtruded, or, in the most favorable event, the partition of the empire into rival and hostile confederacies will ensue.