Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v4.djvu/647

Rh 57. The government of the United States can claim no powers which are not granted to it by the Constitution, either expressly or by necessary implication. Ibid.

58. The Constitution, like every other grant, is to have a reasonable construction, according to the import of its terms; the words are to be taken in their natural and obvious sense, and not in a sense either unreasonably restricted or enlarged. Ibid.

59. The power of naturalization is exclusively in Congress. Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheal. 359.

See ante, No. 1.

60. The grant, in the Constitution, to the United States, of all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, does not extend to a cession of the waters in which those cases may rise, or of the general jurisdiction over them. United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336.

61. Congress may pass all laws which are necessary for giving the most complete effect to the exercise of the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, granted in the Constitution to the United States; but the general jurisdiction, subject to this grant, adheres to the territory, as a portion of sovereignty not yet given away, and the residuary powers of legislation still remain in the state. Ibid.

62. Congress has power to provide for the punishment of offences committed by persons serving on board a ship of war of the United States, wherever that ship may be; but Congress has not exercised that power in the case of a ship lying in the waters of the United States. Ibid.

63. Since the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, a state has authority to pass a bankrupt law, (provided such law does not impair the obligation of contracts,) provided there be no acts of Congress in force to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy conflicting with such law. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122. Contra, Golden v. Prince, 3 Wash. C. C. R. 313, 5 Hall's Am. L. Journ. 502. S. C. Accord, Adams v. Storey, 6 Hall's Am. L. Journ. 474.

64. The mere grant of a power to Congress does not imply a prohibition on the states to exercise the same power. Ibid.

65. Whenever the terms in which a power is granted to Congress require that it should be exercised exclusively by Congress, the subject is as completely taken from the state legislatures, as if they had been expressly forbidden to act upon it. Ibid.

66. To release the future acquisitions of a debtor from liability to a contract, impairs its obligation. Ibid. 198.

67. Statutes of limitation, and usury laws, unless retroactive in their effect, do not impair the obligation of contracts, within the meaning of the Constitution. Ibid.

68. The right of the states to pass bankrupt laws is not extinguished by the enactment of a uniform bankrupt law throughout the Union by Congress; it is only suspended. The repeal of that law cannot confer that power upon the states, but it removes a disability to exercise, which was created by the act of Congress. Ibid.

69. The act of the legislature of the state of New York, of April 3d, 1811 which not only liberated the person of the debtor, but discharged him from all liability for any debt contracted previous to his discharge, on his surrendering his property in the manner prescribed, so far as it attempted to discharge the contract, is a law impairing the obligation of contracts within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States, and is not a good plea in bar of an action brought upon such contract. Ibid.

70. A state bankrupt or an insolvent law, which not only liberates the person of the debtor, but discharges him from all liability for the debt, so far as it attempts to discharge the contract, is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States; and it makes no difference whether the law was passed before or after the debt was contracted. M'Millan v. M'Neil, 4 Wheat. 209.

71. The act of Assembly of Maryland, of 1793, incorporating the Bank of Columbia, and giving to the corporation a summary process by execution, in the nature of an attachment, against its debtors, who have, by an express