Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v4.djvu/530

514 thirds of the states." It will be seen, therefore, at once, that a minority, whose constitutional rights are violated, can have no redress by an amendment of the Constitution. When any state is brought into direct collision with the federal government, in the case of an attempt, by the latter, to exercise unconstitutional powers, the appeal must be made by Congress, (the party proposing to exert the disputed powers,) in order to have it expressly conferred; and until so conferred, the exercise of such authority must be suspended. Even in case of doubt, such an appeal is due to the peace and harmony of the government. On this subject our present chief magistrate, in his opening message to Congress, says, "I regard an appeal to the source of power, in cases of real doubt, and where its exercise is deemed indispensable to the general welfare, as among the most sacred of all our obligations. Upon this country, more than any other, has, in the providence of God, been cast the special guardianship of the great principle of adherence to written constitutions. If it fail here, all hope in regard to it will be extinguished. That this was intended to be a government of limited and specific, and not general powers, must be admitted by all; and it is our duty to preserve for it the character intended by its framers. The scheme has worked well. It has exceeded the hopes of those who devised it, and become an object of admiration to the world. Nothing is clearer, in my view, than that we are chiefly indebted for the success of the Constitution, under which we are now acting, to the watchful and auxiliary operation of the state authorities. This is not the reflection of a day, but belongs to the most deeply-rooted convictions of my mind. I cannot, therefore, too strongly or too earnestly, for my own sense of its importance, warn you against all encroachments upon the legitimate sphere of state sovereignty. Sustained by its healthful and invigorating influence, the federal system can never fail."

I have already shown, that it has been fully recognized by the Virginia resolutions of '98, and by Mr. Madison's report on these resolutions, that it is not only "the right but the duty of the states" to "judge of infractions of the Constitution," and to interpose for maintaining within their limits the authorities, rights, and liberties, appertaining to them.

Mr. Jefferson, on various occasions, expressed himself in language equally strong. In the Kentucky resolutions of '98, prepared by him, it is declared that the federal government "was not made the exclusive and final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to itself, since that would have made its discretion, and not the Constitution, the measure of its powers; but that, as in all other cases of compact among parties having no common judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of infractions as the mode and measure of redress."

In the Kentucky resolutions of '99, it is even more explicitly declared "that the several states which formed the Constitution, being sovereign and independent, have the unquestionable right to judge of its infraction, and that nullification by those sovereignties of all unauthorized acts done under color of that instrument is the rightful remedy."

But the gentleman says, this right will be dangerous. Sir, I insist that, of all the checks that have been provided by the Constitution, this is by far the safest, and the least liable to abuse.

But there is one point of view in which this matter presents itself to my mind with irresistible force. The Supreme Court, it is admitted, may nullify an act of Congress, by declaring it to be unconstitutional. Can Congress, after such a nullification, proceed to enforce the law, even if