Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v4.djvu/455

1797, 1798.] those states who had neglected their militia to revise and amend their laws, and make them more effectual. This is all this house can do—all they have a right to do.



, February 25, 1797.

Mr. GALLATIN conceived the power of granting money to be vested solely in the legislature, and though, according to the opinion of some gentlemen, (though not in his,) the President and Senate could so bind the nation as to oblige the legislature to appropriate money to carry a treaty into effect, yet, in all other cases, he did not suppose there had been any doubt with respect to the powers of the legislature in this respect.

March 2, 1797.

Mr. NICHOLAS. The power of this house to control appropriations has been settled. It was indeed an absurdity to call a body a legislature, and at the same time deny them a control over the public purse. If it were not so, where would be the use of going through the forms of that house with a money bill? The executive might as well draw upon the treasury at once for whatever sums he might stand in need of. A doctrine like this would be scouted even in despotic countries.

 

, January 18, 1798.

Mr. GALLATIN said, he believed, upon the whole, our government was in a great degree pure. Patronage was not very extensive, nor had it any material effect upon the house, or any other part of the government; yet he could suppose our government to be liable to abuse in this way. By the nature of the government, the different powers were divided; the power of giving offices was placed in the executive—an influence which neither of the other branches possessed; and if too large grants of money were made, it might give to that power an improper weight.

Our government, he said, was in its childhood; and if patronage had any existence, it could not, of course, be as yet alarming; but he desired gentlemen to look at all governments where this power was placed in the executive, and see if the greatest evil of the government was not the excessive influence of that department. Did not this corruption exist, in the government which was constituted most similar to ours, to such a degree as to have become a part of the system itself, and without which, it is said, the government could not go on? Was it not, therefore, prudent to keep a watchful eye in this respect?

He did not, however, speak against the power itself: it was necessary to be placed somewhere. The Constitution had fixed it in the executive. If the same power had been placed in the legislature, he believed they would have been more corrupt than the executive. He thought, therefore, the trust was wisely placed in the executive.

January 19, 1798.

On the same occasion, Mr. PINCKNEY said, all commercial regulations might as well be carried on by consuls as by ministers; and if any 