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1796.] found in any treaty that ever was made, either where territory was ceded, or where it was acknowledged by one nation or another. Although it was common and right, in such regulation, in favor of the property of the inhabitants, yet he believed that, in every case that ever had happened, the owners of landed property were universally required to swear allegiance to the new sovereign, or to dispose of their landed property within a reasonable time. With respect to the great points in the law of nations, comprehended in the stipulations of the treaty, the same want of real reciprocity, and the same sacrifice of the interests of the United States, were conspicuous.

It is well known to have been a great and favorite object with the United States, "that free ships make free goods." They had established the principle in their other treaties. They had witnessed, with anxiety, the general efforts, and the successful advances, towards incorporating this principle into the law of nations—a principle friendly to all neutral nations, and particularly interesting to the United States. He knew that, at a former period, it had been conceded, on the part of the United States, that the law of nations stood as the present treaty regulates it. But it did not follow, that more than acquiescence in that doctrine was proper. There was an evident distinction between silently acquiescing in it, and giving it the support of a formal and positive stipulation. The former was all that could have been required, and the latter was more than ought to have been unnecessarily yielded.

Mr. LYMAN. I have no doubt of its constitutionality, notwithstanding all the arguments which I have either seen or heard. Many arguments might be adduced in support of this opinion; but I will dispense with all but one, and that I consider as conclusive; and that is this: The stipulations in this treaty are nearly all of such nature as not to respect objects of legislation. They respect objects which lie beyond the bounds of our sovereignty; and beyond these limits our laws cannot extend, as rules to regulate the conduct of subjects of foreign powers; and although some of these stipulations respect objects which are within the reach of our sovereignty, yet it is in such manner as to be not only pertinent, but perhaps absolutely necessary in forming the treaty. This conclusion, I think, is the natural and necessary result of a fair construction of the principles of the Constitution, and especially of that paragraph which vests the power of making treaties in the supreme executive, with the advice of the Senate.

In acts of the smallest importance, we see, daily, that, after they have undergone any possible chance of fair and impartial discussion in this house, they are transmitted to another, who equally proceed to correct and amend them; and even this not being deemed sufficient to secure, as it were, against all possibility of danger, they are sent to the President, who has ten days to consider, and who may return them with his objections. These we are bound respectfully to inscribe on our Journals, and if we disagree in opinion with the President, the majority of two thirds of both branches is requisite to give validity to the law. Do we not discover in all this infinite caution a wish rather not to act at all, by the difference of the branches among each other, than to act imprudently or precipitately? and can we imagine that a Constitution thus guarded with respect to laws if little consequence, hath left without check the immense power of making treaties—embracing, as in the instrument before us, all our greatest interests, whether they be of territory, of agriculture, commerce,