Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v4.djvu/412

396 Certainly this assumed principle is very often untrue; but if it is true. It is not favorable to the gentlemen's doctrine. The President, I contend, has expressly the power of nominating and appointing, though he must obtain the consent of the Senate. He is the agent: the Senate may prevent his acting, but cannot act themselves. It may be difficult to illustrate this point by examples which will exactly correspond: but suppose the case of an executor, to whom is devised lands, to be sold with the advice of a certain person, on certain conditions; the executor sells with the consent, and upon the conditions, required in the will: the conditions are broken; may the executor reënter for the breach of them? or has the person whom he was obliged to consult with in the sale any power to restrain him? The executor may remove the wrongful possessor from the land, though, perhaps, by the will, he may hold it in trust for another person's benefit. In this manner, the President may remove from office, though, when vacant, he cannot fill it without the advice of the Senate. We are told it is dangerous to adopt constructions; and that what is not expressly given is retained. Surely it is as improper in this way to confer power upon the Senate as upon the President; for if the power is not in the President solely by the Constitution, it never can be in the President and Senate by any grant of that instrument: any arguments, therefore, that tend to make the first doubtful, operate against the other, and make it absurd. If gentlemen, therefore, doubt with respect to the first point, they will certainly hesitate with respect to the other. If the Senate have not the power,—and it is proved that they have it not, by the arguments on both sides,—the power either vests with the President or the legislature. If it is in the disposal of the latter, and merely a matter of choice with us, clearly we ought not to bestow it on the Senate; for the doubt, whether the President is not already entitled to it, is an argument against placing it in other hands: besides, the exercise of it by the Senate would be inconvenient; they are not always sitting: it would be insecure, because they are not responsible: it would be subversive of the great principles of the Constitution, and destructive to liberty, because it tends to intermingle executive and legislative powers in one body of men, and this blending of powers ever forms a tyranny. The Senate are not to accuse offenders; they are to try them: they are not to give orders; but, on complaint, to judge of the breach of them. We are warned against betraying the liberties of our country: we are told that all powers tend to abuse: it is our duty, therefore, to keep them single and distinct. Where the executive swallows up the legislature, it becomes a despotism; where the legislature trenches upon the executive, it approaches towards despotism; and where they have less than is necessary, it approximates towards anarchy.

We should be careful, therefore, to preserve the limits of each authority, in the present question. As it respects the power of the people, it is but of little importance; it is not pretended that the people have reserved the power of removing bad officers. It is admitted, on all hands, that the government is possessed of such power; consequently, the people can neither lose nor gain power by it. We are the servants of the people, we are the watchmen; and we should be unfaithful, in both characters, if we should so administer the government as to destroy its great principles and most essential advantages. The question now among us is, which of these servants shall exercise a power already granted. Wise and virtuous as the Senate may be, such a power lodged in their hands will not only tend