Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v4.djvu/410

394. I remember that the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Sedgwick) told us that the two houses, notwithstanding the partial negative of the President, possessed the whole legislative power; but will the gentleman infer from that, because the concurrence of both branches is necessary to pass a law, that a less authority can repeal it? This is all we contend for.

Some gentlemen suppose, if the President has not the power by the Constitution, we ought to vest it in him by law. For my part, I very much doubt if we have the power to do this. I take it we would be placing the heads of departments in a situation inferior to what the Constitution contemplates; but if we have the power, it will be better to exercise it than attempt to construe the Constitution. But it appears to me, that the best way will be to leave the Constitution to speak for itself whenever occasion demands.

It has been said, that the Senate are merely an advisory body. I am not of this opinion, because their consent is expressly required; if this is not obtained, an appointment cannot be made. Upon the whole, I look upon it as necessary, in order to preserve that security which the Constitution affords to the liberty of the people, that we avoid making this declaration, especially in favor of the President; as I do not believe the Constitution vests the authority in him alone.

Mr. AMES. I believe there are very few gentlemen on this floor who have not made up their opinions; therefore it is particularly disagreeable to solicit their attention, especially when their patience is already exhausted, and their curiosity sated; but still I hope to be of some use in collecting the various arguments, and bringing them to a point. I shall rather confine myself to this task, than attempt to offer any thing that is new. I shall just observe, that the arguments of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Scott,) which are complained of as being ridiculous, were arguments addressed to the understandings of the committee; my own understanding was enlightened by them, although they wore the garb of pleasantry. But to proceed to my main object.

The question, so far as it relates to the Constitution, is this—whether it has vested the sole power of removing in the President alone, or whether it is to take place by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, If the question of constitutionality was once dispatched, we should be left to consider of the expediency of the measure. I take it to be admitted on all hands, though it was at first objected to by a worthy gentleman from South Carolina, that the power of removal from office, at pleasure, resides somewhere in the government. If it does not reside in the President, or the President and Senate, or if the Constitution has not vested it in any particular body, it must be in the legislature; for it is absurd to suppose that officers once appointed cannot be removed. The argument tending to prove that the power is in the President alone, by an express declaration, may not be satisfactory to the minds of those gentlemen who deem the Constitution to be silent on that head. But let those gentlemen revert to the principles, spirit, and tendency, of the Constitution, and they will be compelled to acknowledge that there is the highest degree of probability that the power does vest in the President of the United States. I shall not undertake to say that the arguments are conclusive on this point. I do not suppose it is necessary that they should be so; for I believe nearly as good conclusions may be drawn from the refutations of an argument as from any other proof; for it is well said, that destructio unius est generatio alterius.