Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v4.djvu/408

344 constitution itself. But Congress may, if once the doctrine of construction is established, make the Constitution what they please, and the President can have no control over them.

It has been said by my colleague, (Mr. Sedgwick,) that the President not only nominates, but appoints, the officers; and he infers from hence, that, as the power of removal is incidental to the power of appointing, the President has the power of removal also. But I should be glad to know how it can with justice be said that the President appoints. The Constitution requires the consent of the Senate; therefore they are two distinct bodies, and intended to check each other. If my colleague's is a true construction, it may be extended farther, and said, that, in the act of nominating, the assent of the Senate is virtually given, and therefore he has a right to make the whole appointment himself, without any interference on the part of the Senate. I contend, sir, that there is just as much propriety in the one construction as in the other. If we observe the enacting style of the statutes of Great Britain, we shall find pretty near the same words as what are used in the Constitution with respect to appointments:—"Be it enacted by the king's most excellent majesty, by and with the advice and consent of Parliament." Here it might be said the king enacts all laws; but I believe the truth of this fact will be disputed in that country. I believe no one will pretend to say that the king is the three branches of Parliament; and unless my colleague will do all this, I never can admit that the President, in himself, has the power of appointment.

My colleague has gone farther, to show the dependence of this officer on the President. He says the necessity of appointing a secretary of foreign affairs arises from a natural defect in man; that if the President was able to administer all these departments, there would be no occasion of making provision by law. If the President had power superior to the limits of humanity, he might render his country great services; but we are not likely to have any such Presidents; the Constitution itself contemplates none; it makes provision for the infirmities of human nature; it authorizes us to establish offices by law; and this is the ground upon which we stand; indeed, this is the ground that was assumed yesterday by my colleague, when he said that this officer was the creature of the law. If he is the creature of the law, let him conduct according to law; and let it not be contended that he is the creature of the President, because he is no further the creature of the President than that he is obliged to give his opinion in writing when required. But it is said the President is responsible for the conduct of this officer. I wish to know what this responsibility is. Does it mean, if a subordinate executive officer commits treason, that the President is to suffer for it? This is a strange kind of responsibility. Suppose, in the case of the secretary of the treasury, there should be a defalcation of the public revenue; is he to make good the loss? Or, if the head of the army should betray his trust, and sacrifice the liberties of his country, is the President's head to be the devoted sacrifice? The Constitution shows the contrary, by the provision made for impeachment; and this I take to be one of the strongest arguments against the President's having the power of removing one of the principal officers of government—that he is to bear his own responsibility.

The question before the committee must be decided on one of these two grounds. Either they must suppose this power is delegated particularly to the President by the Constitution, or it is not. Let, us examine these two cases. If gentleman say that it is delegated by the