Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v4.djvu/407

1789.] Gentlemen say they have a sufficient remedy for every evil likely to result from connecting the Senate with the President. This they propose to do by allowing the power of suspension. This, in the first place, does not answer the end; because there is a possibility that the officer may not be displaced after a hearing before the Senate; and in the second place, it is entirely inconsistent with the whole course of reasoning pursued by the gentlemen in opposition. I would ask them, if the Constitution does not give to the President the power of removal, what part is it that gives the power of suspension? If you will in one case construe the Constitution, you may do it in another; for I look upon it as dangerous to give the power of suspension, by implication, as to give the full power of removal. Gentlemen, observe that I take it for granted that the President has no express right to the power of suspension; and that, if he is to exercise it, it must be drawn, by constructive reasoning alone, from the Constitution. If we are to exercise our authority, we had better at once give a power that would answer two valuable purposes, than one altogether nugatory. In the first place, it would entirely separate the legislative and executive departments, conformably to the great principles of the Constitution; and in the second place, it would answer the end of government better, and secure real benefits to the Union.

The great evil, as was stated by the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Madison,) yesterday, is, that bad officers shall continue in office, and not that good ones be removed; yet this last is all that is in the power of the President. If he removes a good officer, he cannot appoint his successor without the consent of the Senate; and it is fairly to be presumed, that, if at any time he should be guilty of such an oversight as to remove a useful and valuable officer, the evil will be small, because another as valuable will be placed in his stead. If it is said that this is an injury to the individual, I confess that it is possible that it may be so. But ought we not, in the first place, to consult the public good ] But, on mature consideration, I do not apprehend any very great injury will result to the individual from this practice; because, when he accepts of the office, he knows the tenure by which he is to hold it, and ought to be prepared against every contingency.

These being the principles on which I have formed my opinion, in addition to what was stated, I do conceive that I am perfectly justified to my constituents, and to my oath, to support this construction. And when I give my vote that the President ought to have the power of removal from office, I do it on principle; and gentlemen in the opposition will leave us to the operation of our judgments on this as well as every other question that comes before us. For my part, I conceive it is impossible to carry into execution the powers of the President, in a salutary manner, unless he has the power of removal vested in him. I do not mean that, if it was not vested in him by the Constitution, it would be proper for Congress to confer it, though I do believe the government would otherwise be very defective; yet we would have to bear this inconvenience until it was rectified by an amendment of the Constitution.

Mr. GERRY. The Parliament of England is one of the most important bodies on earth; but they can do nothing without the concurrence of the executive magistrate. The Congress of the United States are likely to become a more important body; the executive magistrate has but a qualified negative over them. The Parliament of England, with the consent of the king, can expound their constitution; in fact, they are the