Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v4.djvu/397

1789.] reflections beforehand in the mind of any man who may fill the presidential chair: the friends of those individuals, and the public sympathy, will be against him. If this should not produce his impeachment before the Senate, it will amount to an impeachment before the community, who will have the power of punishment by refusing to reëlect him. But suppose this persecuted individual cannot obtain revenge in this mode: there are other modes in which he could make the situation of the President very inconvenient, if you suppose him resolutely bent on executing the dictates of resentment. If he had not influence enough to direct the vengeance of the whole community, he may probably be able to obtain an appointment in one or other branch of the legislature; and, being a man of weight, talents, and influence, in either case he may prove to the President troublesome indeed. We have seen examples, in the history of other nations, which justify the remark I now have made: though the prerogatives of the British king are as great as his rank, and it is unquestionably known that he has a positive influence over both branches of the legislative body, yet there have been examples in which the appointment and removal of ministers has been found to be dictated by one or other of those branches. Now, if this is the case with an hereditary monarch, possessed of those high prerogatives, and furnished with so many means of influence, can we suppose a President, elected for four years only, dependent upon the popular voice, impeachable by the legislature, little if at all distinguished, for wealth, personal talents, or influence, from the head of the department himself;—I say, will he bid defiance to all these considerations, and wantonly dismiss a meritorious and virtuous officer? Such abuse of power exceeds my conception. If any thing takes place in the ordinary course of business of this kind, my imagination cannot extend to it on any rational principle.

But let us not consider the question on one side only: there are dangers to be contemplated on the other. Vest the power in the Senate jointly with the President, and you abolish at once the great principle of unity and responsibility in the executive department, which was intended for the security of liberty and the public good. If the President should possess alone the power of removal from office, those who are employed in the execution of the law will be in their proper situation, and the chain of dependence be preserved; the lowest officer, the middle grade, and the highest, will depend, as they ought, on the President, and the President on the community. The chain of dependence, therefore, terminates in the supreme body, namely, in the people; who will possess besides, in aid of their original power, the decisive engine of impeachment. Take the other supposition—that the power should be vested in the Senate, on the principle that the power to displace is necessarily connected with the power to appoint. It is declared by the Constitution, that we may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers in the heads of departments, the power of removal being incidental, as stated by some gentlemen. Where does this terminate? If you begin with the subordinate officers, they are dependent on their superior, he on the next superior, and he, on whom?—on the Senate, a permanent body, by its peculiar mode of election, in reality existing forever—a body possessing that proportion of aristocratic power which the Constitution no doubt thought wise to be established in the system, but which some have strongly excepted against. And, let me ask, gentlemen, is there equal security in this case as in the other? Shall we trust the Senate, responsible to individual legislatures, rather than the