Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v4.djvu/392

376 with it. I do not believe it is absolutely necessary that he should have such power, because the power of suspending would answer all the purposes which gentlemen have in view by giving the power of removal. I do not think that the officer is only to be removed by impeachment, as is argued by the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. Smith;) because he is the mere creature of the law, and we can direct him to be removed on conviction of mismanagement or inability, without calling upon the Senate for their concurrence. But I believe, if we make no such provision, he may constitutionally be removed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; and I believe it would be most expedient for us to say nothing in the clause on the subject.

Mr. STONE. I think it necessary, Mr. Chairman, to determine the question before us. I do not think it would do to leave it to the determination of courts of law hereafter. It should be our duty, in cases like the present, to give our opinion on the construction of the Constitution.

When the question was brought forward, I felt unhappy, because my mind was in doubt; but since then, I have deliberately reflected upon it, and have made up an opinion perfectly satisfactory to myself I consider that, in general, every officer who is appointed should be removed by the power that appoints him. It is so in the nature of things. The power of appointing an officer arises from the power over the subject on which the officer is to act. It arises from the principal, who appoints, having an interest in, and a right to conduct, the business which he does by means of an agent; therefore this officer appears to be nothing more than an agent appointed for the convenient dispatch of business. This is my opinion on this subject, and the principle will operate from a minister of state down to a tide-waiter. The Constitution, it is admitted by every gentleman, recognizes the principle; because it has not been denied, whenever general appointments are made under the Constitution, that they are to be at will and pleasure; that where an appointment is made during good behavior, it is an exception to the general rule; there you limit the exercise of the power which appoints : it is thus in the case of the judges.

Let us examine, then, whence originates the power of Congress with respect to the officer under consideration. I presume it is expressly contained in the Constitution, or clearly deducible from that instrument, that we have a right to erect the department of foreign affairs. No gentleman will consent to a reduction or relinquishment of that power. The Constitution has given us the power of laying and collecting taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; this includes the power of organizing a revenue board. It gives us power to regulate commerce; this includes the power of establishing a board of trade: to make war, and organize the militia; this enables us to establish a minister at war: and generally to make all laws necessary to carry these powers into effect. Now, it appears to me, that the erection of this department is expressly within the Constitution Therefore it seems to me, as Congress, in their legislative capacity, have an interest in, and power over, this whole transaction, that they consequently appoint and displace their officers. But there is a provision in the Constitution which takes away from us the power of appointing officers of a certain description; they are to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; then the Constitution limits the legislature in appointing certain officers, which would otherwise be within their power.