Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v4.djvu/390

374 ground, I should be totally indifferent whether the words were struck out or not; because I am clear that the executive has the power of removal, as incident to his department; and if the Constitution had been silent with respect to the appointment, he would have had that power also. The reason, perhaps, why it was mentioned in the Constitution, was to give some further security against the improper introduction of improper men into office. But in cases of removal there is not such necessity for this check. What great danger would arise from the removal of a worthy man, when the Senate must be consulted in the appointment of his successor? Is it likely that they will consent to advance an improper character? The presumption therefore is, that he would not abuse this power; or, if he did, only one good man would be changed for another.

If the President is divested of this power, his responsibility is destroyed; you prevent his efficiency, and disable him from affording that security to the people which the Constitution contemplates. What use will it be of, to call the citizens of the Union together every four years to obtain a purified choice of a representative, if he is to be a mere cipher in the government? The executive must act by others; but you reduce him to a mere shadow, when you control both the power of appointment and removal. If you take away the latter power, he ought to resign the power of superintending and directing the executive parts of government into the hands of the Senate at once; and then we become a dangerous aristocracy, or shall be more destitute of energy than any government on earth. These being my sentiments, I wish the clause to stand as a legislative declaration that the power of removal is constitutionally vested in the President.

Mr. PAGE. I venture to assert that this clause of the bill contains in it the seeds of royal prerogative. If gentlemen lay such stress on the energy of the government, I beg them to consider how far this doctrine may go. Every thing which has been said in favor of energy in the executive may go to the destruction of freedom, and establish despotism. This very energy, so much talked of, has led many patriots to the Bastile, to the block, and to the halter. If the chief magistrate can take a man away from the head of a department without assigning any reason, he may as well be invested with power, on certain occasions, to take away his existence. But will you contend that this idea is consonant with the principles of a free government, where no man ought to be condemned unheard, nor till after a solemn conviction of guilt on a fair and impartial trial? It would, in my opinion, be better to suffer, for a time, the mischief arising from the conduct of a bad officer, than admit principles which would lead to the establishment of despotic prerogatives.

There can be little occasion for the President to exercise this power, unless you suppose that the appointments will be made in a careless manner, which by no means is likely to be the case. If, then, you have a good officer, why should he be made dependent upon the will of a single man? Suppose a colonel in your army should disobey his orders, or cowardly flee before the enemy; what would the general do? Would he be at liberty to dismiss the officer? No; he would suspend him, until a court-martial was held to decide the degree of guilt. If gentlemen had been content to say that the President might suspend, I should second their motion, and afterward the officer might be removed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; but to make every officer of the government dependent on the will and pleasure of one man, will be vesting