Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v4.djvu/389

1789.] brain. Behold the baneful influence of the royal prerogative. All officers till lately held their commissions during the pleasure of the crown.

At this moment, see the king of Sweden aiming at arbitrary power, shutting the doors of his senate, and compelling, by the force of arms, his shuddering councilors to acquiesce in his despotic mandates. I agree that this is the hour in which we ought to establish our government; but it is an hour in which we should be wary and cautious, especially in what respects the executive magistrate. With him every power may be safely lodged. Black, indeed, is the heart of that man who even suspects him to be capable of abusing them. But alas! he cannot be with us forever; he is liable to the vicissitudes of life; he is but mortal; and though I contemplate it with great regret, yet I know the period must come which will separate him from his country; and can we know the virtues or vices of his successor in a very few years? May not a man with a Pandora's box in his breast come into power, and give us sensible cause to lament our present confidence and want of foresight?

A gentleman has declared that, as the Constitution has given the power of appointment, it has consequently given the power of removal. I agree with him in all that the Constitution expressly grants, but I must differ in the constructive reasoning. It was said by the advocates of this Constitution, that the powers not given up in that instrument were reserved to the people. Under this impression, it has been proposed, as a favorite amendment to the Constitution, that it should be declared that all powers not expressly given should be retained. As to what gentlemen have said of its giving satisfaction to the people, I deny it. They never can be pleased that we should give new and extraordinary powers to the executive. We must confine ourselves to the powers described in the Constitution; and the moment we pass it, we take an arbitrary stride toward a despotic government.

The gentleman from New York (Mr. Lawrence) contends that the President appoints, and therefore he ought to remove. I shall agree to give him the same power, in cases of removal, as he has in appointing; but nothing more. Upon this principle, I would agree to give him the power of suspension during the recess of the Senate. This, in my opinion, would effectually provide against those inconveniences which have been apprehended, and not expose the government to the abuses we have to dread from the wanton and uncontrolled authority of removing officers at pleasure. I am the friend of an energetic government; but while we are giving vigor to the executive arm, we ought to be careful not to lay the foundation of future tyranny.

For my part, I must declare that I think this power too great to be safely trusted in the hands of a single man; especially in the hands of a man who has so much constitutional power. I believe, if those powers had been more contracted, the system of government would have been more generally agreeable to our constituents; that is, at present it would conform more to the popular opinion, at least. For my part, though I came from a state where the energy of government can be useful, and where it is at this moment wanting, I cannot agree to extend this power; because I conceive it may, at some future period, be exercised in such a way as to subvert the liberties of my country; and no consideration shall ever induce me to put them in jeopardy. It is under this impression that I shall vote decidedly against the clause.

Mr. CLYMER. If I was to give my vote merely on constitutional