Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v4.djvu/388

372 Constitution, and can only be eradicated by weeding it out of that instrument. It may therefore be a proper subject for amendment, when we come to consider that business again.

It has been observed, that the President ought to have this power to remove a man when he becomes obnoxious to the people, or disagreeable to himself. Are we, then, to have all the officers the mere creatures of the President? This thirst of power will introduce a treasury bench into the house, and we shall have ministers obtrude upon us to govern and direct the measures of the legislature, and to support the influence of their master; and shall we establish a different influence between the people and the President? I suppose these circumstances must take place, because they have taken place in other countries. The executive power falls to the ground in England, if it cannot be supported by the Parliament; therefore a high game of corruption is played, and a majority secured to the ministry by the introduction of placemen and pensioners.

The gentlemen have brought forward arguments drawn from possibility. It is said that our secretary of foreign affairs may become unfit for his office by a fit of lunacy, and therefore a silent remedy should be applied. It is true such a case may happen; but it may also happen in cases where there is no power of removing. Suppose the President should be taken with a fit of lunacy; would it be possible by such arguments to remove him? I apprehend he must remain in office during his four years. Suppose the Senate should be seized with a fit of lunacy, and it was to extend to the House of Representatives; what could the people do but endure this mad Congress till the term of their election expired? We have seen a king of England in an absolute fit of lunacy, which produced an interregnum in the government. The same may happen here with respect to our President; and although it is improbable that the majority of both houses of Congress may be in that situation, yet it is by no means impossible. But gentlemen have brought forward another argument, with respect to the judges. It is said they are to hold their offices during good behavior. I agree that ought to be the case. But is not a judge liable to the act of God, as well as any other officer of government? However great his legal knowledge, his judgment and integrity, it may be taken from him at a stroke, and he rendered the most unfit of all men to fill such an important office. But can you remove him? Not for this cause: it is impossible; because madness is no treason, crime, or misdemeanor. If he does not choose to resign, like Lord Mansfield he may continue in office for ninety or one hundred years; for so long have some men retained their faculties.

But let me ask gentlemen if it is possible to place their officers in such a situation—to deprive them of their independency and firmness; for I apprehend it is not intended to stop with the secretary of foreign affairs. Let it be remembered that the Constitution gives the President the command of the military. If you give him complete power over the man with the strong box, he will have the liberty of America under his thumb. It is easy to see the evil which may result. If he wants to establish an arbitrary authority, and finds the secretary of finance not inclined to second his endeavors, he ha« nothing more to do than to remove him, and get one appointed of principles more congenial with his own. Then says he, "I have got the army; let me have but the money, and I will establish my throne upon the ruins of your visionary republic." Let no gentleman say I am contemplating imaginary dangers—the mere chimeras of a heated