Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v4.djvu/387

1789.] We ought not to consider one side alone; we should consider the benefit of such an arrangement, as well as the difficulties. We should also consider the difficulties arising from the exercise of the power of removing by the Senate. It was well observed by an honorable gentleman (Mr. Sedgwick) on this point, that the Senate must continue in session the whole year, or be hastily assembled from the extremes and all parts of the continent, whenever the President thinks a removal necessary. Suppose an ambassador, or minister plenipotentiary, negotiating or intriguing contrary to his instructions, and to the injury of the United States; before the Senate can be assembled to accede to his recall, the interest of his country may be betrayed, and the evil irrevocably perpetrated. A great number of such instances could be enumerated; but I will not take up the time of the committee; gentlemen may suggest them to their own minds; and I imagine they will be sufficient to convince them that, with respect to the expediency, the power of removal ought not to be in the Senate.

I take it, Mr. Chairman, that it is proper for the legislature to speak their sense upon those points on which the Constitution is silent. I believe the judges will never decide that we are guilty of a breach of the Constitution, by declaring a legislative opinion in cases where the Constitution is silent. If the laws shall be in violation of any part of the Constitution, the judges will not hesitate to decide against them. Where the power is incident to the government, and the Constitution is silent, it can be no impediment to a legislative grant. I hold it necessary, in such cases, to make provision. In the case of removal, the Constitution is silent. The wisdom of the legislature should therefore declare in what place the power resides.

Mr. JACKSON. As a constitutional question, it is of great moment, and worthy of full discussion. I am, sir, a friend to the full exercise of all the powers of government, and deeply impressed with the necessity there exists of having an energetic executive. But, friend as I am to the efficient government, I value the liberties of my fellow-citizens beyond every other consideration; and where I find them endangered, I am willing to forego every other blessing to secure them. I hold it as good a maxim as it is an old one—of two evils to choose the least.

It has been mentioned, that in all governments the executive magistrate had the power of dismissing officers under him. This may hold good in Europe, where monarchs claim their powers jure divino; but it never can be admitted in America, under a Constitution delegating enumerated powers. It requires more than a mere ipse dixit to demonstrate that any power is in its nature executive, and consequently given to the President of the United States by the present Constitution. But if this power is incident to the executive branch of government, it does not follow that it vests in the President alone; because he alone does not possess all executive powers. The Constitution has lodged the power of forming treaties, and all executive business, I presume, connected therewith, in the President; but it is qualified by and with the advice and consent of the Senate—provided two thirds of the Senate agree therein. The same has taken place with respect to appointing officers. From this I infer that those arguments are done away which the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Madison) used, to prove that it was contrary to the principles of the Constitution that we should blend the executive and legislative powers in the same body. It may be wrong that the great powers of government should be blended in this manner, but we cannot separate them: the error is adopted in the