Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v4.djvu/386

370 But supposing the power to vest in the Senate, is it more safe in their hands than where we contend it should be 1 Would it be more satisfactory to our constituents for us to make such a declaration in their favor? I believe not.

With respect to this and every case omitted, but which can be collected from the other provisions made in the Constitution, the people look up to the legislature, the concurrent opinion of the two branches, for their construction; they conceive those cases proper subjects for legislative wisdom; they naturally suppose, where provisions are to be made, they ought to spring from this source, and this source alone.

From a view of these circumstances, we may be induced to meet the question in force. Shall we now venture to supply the defect? For my part, I have no hesitation. We should supply the defect; we should place the power of removal in the great executive officer of the government.

In the Constitution, the heads of departments are considered as the mere assistants of the President in the performance of his executive duties. He has the superintendence, the control, and the inspection, of their conduct; he has an intimate connection with them; they must receive from him his orders and directions; they must answer his inquiries in writing, when he requires it. Shall the person having these superior powers to govern—with such advantages of discovering and defeating the base intentions of his officers, their delinquencies, their defective abilities, or their negligence—be restrained from applying these advantages to the most useful, nay, in some cases, the only useful purpose which can be answered by them?

It appears to me that the power can be safely lodged here. But it has been said by some gentlemen, that if it is lodged here it will be subject to abuse; that there may be a change of officers, and a complete revolution throughout the whole executive department, upon the election of every new President. I admit that this may be the case, and contend that it should be the case if the President thinks it necessary. I contend that every President should have those men about him in whom he can place the most confidence, provided the Senate approve his choice. But we are not from hence to infer that changes will be made in a wanton manner, and from capricious motives; because the Presidents are checked and guarded in a very safe manner with respect to the appointment of their successors; from all which it may be fairly presumed that changes will be made on principles of policy and propriety only.

Will the man chosen by three millions of his fellow-citizens, be such a wretch as to abuse them in a wanton manner? For my part I should think, with the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Madison,) that a President, thus selected and honored by his country, is entitled to my confidence; and I see no reason why we should suppose he is more inclined to do harm than good. Elected as he is, I trust we are secure. I do not draw these observations from the safety I conceive under the present administration, or because our chief magistrate is possessed of irradiated virtues, whose lustre brightens this western hemisphere, and incites the admiration of the world! But I calculate upon what our mode of election is likely to bring forward, and the security which the Constitution affords. If the President abuses his trust, will he escape the popular censure when the period which terminates his elevation arrives? And would he pot be liable to impeachment for displacing a worthy and able man who enjoyed the confidence of the people?