Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v4.djvu/380

364 terms. There has never yet been any scarcity of proper officers in any department of the government of the United States; even during the war, when men risked their lives and property by engaging in such service, there were candidates enough.

But why should we connect the Senate in the removal? Their attention is taken up with other important business, and they have no constitutional authority to watch the conduct of the executive officers, and therefore cannot use such authority with advantage. If the President is inclined to shelter himself behind the Senate, with respect to having continued an improper person in office, we lose the responsibility which is our greatest security: the blame, amongst so many, will be lost. Another reason occurs to me against blending these powers. An officer who superintends the public revenue will naturally acquire a great influence. If he obtains support in the Senate, upon an attempt of the President to remove him, it will be out of the power of the house, when applied to by the first magistrate, to impeach him with success; for the very means of proving charges of malconduct against him will be under the power of the officer: all the papers necessary to convict him may be withheld while the person continues in his office. Protection may be rendered for protection; and, as this officer has such extensive influence, it may be exerted to procure the reelection of his friends. These circumstances, in addition to those stated by the gentleman from New Jersey, (Mr. Boudinot,) must clearly evince to every gentleman the impropriety of connecting the Senate with the President, in removing from office.

I do not say these things will take effect now; and if the question only related to what might take place in a few years, I should not be uneasy on this point, because I am sensible the gentlemen who form the present Senate are above corruption; but in future ages, (and I hope this government may be perpetuated to the end of time,) such things may take place, and it is our duty to provide against evils which may be foreseen, but if now neglected, will be irremediable.

I beg to observe, further, that there are three opinions entertained by gentlemen on this subject. One is, that the power of removal is prohibited by the Constitution; the next is, that it requires it by the President; and the other is, that the Constitution is totally silent. It therefore appears to me proper for the house to declare what is their sense of the Constitution. If we declare justly on this point, it will serve for a rule of conduct to the executive magistrate: if we declare improperly, the judiciary will revise our decision; so that, at all events, I think we ought to make the declaration.

Mr. LIVERMORE. I am for striking out this clause, Mr. Chairman, upon the principles of the Constitution, from which we are not at liberty to deviate. The honorable gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Sedgwick) calls the minister of foreign affairs the creature of the law, and that very properly; because the law establishes the office, and has the power of creating him in what shape the legislature pleases. This being the case, we have a right to create the office under such limitations and restrictions as we think proper, provided we can obtain the consent of the Senate; but it is very improper to draw, as a conclusion from having the power of giving birth to a creature, that we should therefore bring forth a monster, merely to show we had such power. I call that creature a monster that has not the proper limbs and features of its species. I think the creature we are forming is unnatural in its proportions. It has been often