Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v4.djvu/379

1789.]. The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Madison) has made so many observations to evince the constitutionality of the clause, that it is unnecessary to go over the ground again. I shall therefore confine myself to answer only some remarks made by the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Smith.) The powers of the President are defined in the Constitution; but it is said that he is not expressly authorized to remove from office. If the Constitution is silent also with respect to the Senate, the argument may be retorted. If this silence proves that the power cannot be exercised by the President, it certainly proves that it cannot be exercised by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The power of removal is incident to government; but, not being distributed by the Constitution, it will come before the legislature, and, like every other omitted case, must be supplied by law.

Gentlemen have said, when the question was formerly before us, that all powers not intended to be given up to the general government were retained. I beg gentlemen, when they undertake to argue from implication, to be consistent, and admit the force of other arguments drawn from the same source. It is a leading principle in every free government—it is a prominent feature in this—that the legislative and executive powers should be kept distinct; yet the attempt to blend the executive and legislative departments, in exercising the power of removal, is such a maxim as ought not to be carried into practice on arguments grounded on implication. And the gentleman from Virginia's (Mr. White's) reasoning is wholly drawn from implication. He supposes, as the Constitution qualifies the President's power of appointing to office, by subjecting his nomination to the concurrence of the Senate, that the qualification follows of course in the removal.

If this is to be considered as a question undecided by the Constitution, and submitted on the footing of expediency, it will be well to consider where the power can be most usefully deposited, for the security and benefit of the people. It has been said by the gentleman on the other side of the house, (Mr. Smith,) that there is an impropriety in allowing the exercise of this power; that it is a dangerous authority, and much evil may result to the liberty and property of the officer who may be turned out of business without a moment's warning. I take it, the question is not whether such power shall be given or retained; because it is admitted, on all hands, that the officer may be removed; so that it is no grant of power—it raises no new danger. If we strike out the clause, we do not keep the power, nor prevent the exercise of it; so the gentleman will derive none of the security he contemplates by agreeing to the motion for striking out. It will be found that the nature of the business requires it to be conducted by the head of the executive; and I believe it will be found, even there, that more injury will arise from not removing improper officers, than from displacing good ones. I believe experience has convinced us that it is an irksome business; and officers are more frequently continued in one place after they become unfit to perform the duties, than turned out while their talents and integrity are useful. But advantages may result from keeping the power of removal, in terrorem, over the heads of the officers; they will be stimulated to do their duty to the satisfaction of the principal, who is to be responsible for the whole executive department.

The gentleman has supposed there will be great difficulty in getting officers of abilities to engage in the service of their country upon such