Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v4.djvu/376

360, though aimed with Machiavellian policy. He would be a barrier to your executive officer, and save the state from ruin.

But, Mr. Chairman, the argument does not turn upon the expediency of the measure. The great question is with respect to its constitutionality, and as yet I have heard no argument advanced sufficiently cogent to prove to my mind that the Constitution warrants such a disposition of the power of removal; and until I am convinced that it is both expedient and constitutional, I cannot agree, to it.

Mr. GERRY. Some gentlemen consider this as a question of policy, but to me it appears a question of constitutionality, and I presume it will be determined on that point alone. The best arguments I have heard urged on this occasion came from the honorable gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Madison.) He says, the Constitution has vested the executive power in the President; and that he has a right to exercise it under the qualifications therein made. He lays it down as a maxim, that the Constitution, vesting in the President the executive power, naturally vests him with the power of appointment and removal. Now, I would be glad to know from that gentleman, by what means we are to decide this question. Is his maxim supported by precedent drawn from the practice of the individual states? The direct contrary is established. In many cases, the executives are not, in particular, vested with the power of appointment, nor do they exercise that power by virtue of their office. It will be found that other branches of the government make appointments. How, then, can gentlemen assert that the powers of appointment and removal are incident to the executive department of the government? To me it appears at best but problematical. Neither is it clear to me that the power that appoints naturally possesses the power of removal. As we have no certainty on either of these points, I think we must consider it, as established by the Constitution.

It has been argued that, if the power of removal vests in the President alone, it annuls or renders nugatory the clause in the Constitution which directs the concurrence of the Senate in the case of appointment: it behooves us not to adopt principles subversive of those established by the Constitution. It has been frequently asserted, on former occasions, that the Senate is a permanent body, and was so constructed in order to give durability to public measures. If they are not absolutely permanent, they are formed on a renovating principle which gives them a salutary stability. This is not the case either with the President or House of Representatives; nor is the judiciary equally lasting, because the officers are subject to natural dissolution. It appears to me that a permanency was expected in the magistracy; and therefore the Senate were combined in the appointment to office. But if the President alone has the power of removal, it is in his power at any time to destroy all that has been done. It appears to me that such a principle would be destructive of the intention of the Constitution expressed by giving the power of appointment to the Senate. It also subverts the clause which gives the Senate the sole power of trying impeachments; because the President may remove the officer, in order to screen him from the effects of their judgment on an impeachment. Why should we construe any part of the Constitution in such a manner as to destroy its essential principles, when a more consonant construction can be obtained?

It appears very clear to me that, however this power may be distributed by the Constitution, the House of Representatives have nothing to do with