Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v4.djvu/374

358, or the reason of the thing, that officers should be only removable by impeachment. Such a provision would be derogatory to the powers of government, and subversive of the rights of the people. What says the Constitution on this point? I fear, sir, it has not been rightly comprehended. That the House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment; that the Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments; and judgment shall not extend further than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold it in future: then comes the clause declaring, absolutely, that he shall be removed from office on impeachment for and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors.

It is this clause which guards the right of the house, and enables them to pull down an improper officer, although he should be supported by all the power of the executive. This, then, is a necessary security to the people, and one that is wisely provided in the Constitution. But I believe it is nowhere said that officers shall never be removed but by impeachment; but it says they shall be removed on impeachment. Suppose the secretary of foreign affairs shall misbehave, and we impeach him; notwithstanding the clearest proof of guilt, the Senate might only impose some trifling punishment, and retain him in office, if it was not for this declaration in the Constitution.

Neither this clause nor any other goes so far as to say it shall be the only mode of removal: therefore we may proceed to inquire what the other is. Let us examine whether it belongs to the Senate and President. Certainly, sir, there is nothing that gives the Senate this right in express terms but they are authorized in express words to be concerned in the appointment. And does this necessarily include the power of removal? If the President complains to the Senate of the misconduct of an officer, and desires their advice and consent to the removal, what are the Senate to do? Most certainly, they will inquire if the complaint is well founded To do this, they must call the officer before them to answer. Who, then, are the parties? The supreme executive officer against his assistant; and then the Senate are to set judges to determine whether sufficient cause of removal exists. Does not this set the Senate over the head of the President? But suppose they shall decide in favor of the officer; what a situation is the President then in, surrounded by officers with whom, by his situation, he is compelled to act, but in whom he can have no confidence, reversing the privilege, given him by the Constitution, to prevent his having officers imposed upon him who do not meet his approbation!

But I have another more solid objection, which places the question in a more important point of view. The Constitution has placed the Senate as the only security and barrier between the House of Representatives and the President. Suppose the President has desired the Senate to concur in removing an officer, and they have declined; or suppose the House have applied to the President and Senate to remove an officer obnoxious to them, and they determine against the measure; the house can have recourse to nothing but an impeachment, if they suppose the criminality of the officer will warrant such procedure. Will the Senate, then, be that upright court which they ought, to appeal to on this occasion, when they have prejudged your cause? I conceive the Senate will be too much under the control of their former decision, to be a proper body for this house to apply to for impartial justice.

As the Senate are the dernier ressort, and the only court of judicature which can determine on cases of impeachment, I am for preserving them