Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v4.djvu/371

1789.] corrected by the particular mode of conducting it, as directed under the present system, I thinly we may fairly calculate that the instances will be very rare in which an unworthy man will receive that mark of public confidence which is required to designate the President of the United States. Where the people are disposed to give so great an elevation to one of their fellow-citizens, I own that I am not afraid to place my confidence in him: especially when I know he is impeachable, for any crime or misdemeanor, before the Senate at all times; and that, at all events, he is impeachable before the community at large every four years, and liable to be displaced if his conduct shall have given umbrage during the time he has been in office. Under these circumstances, although the trust is a high one, and in some degree, perhaps, a dangerous one, I am not sure but it will be safer here than placed where some gentlemen suppose it ought to be.

It is evidently the intention of the Constitution that the first magistrate should be responsible for the executive department; so far, therefore, as we do not make the officers who are to aid him in the duties of that department responsible to him, he is not responsible to his country. Again: is there no danger that an officer, when he is appointed by the concurrence of the Senate, and has friends in that body, may choose rather to risk his establishment on the favor of that branch, than rest it upon the discharge of his duties to the satisfaction of the executive branch, which is constitutionally authorized to inspect and control his conduct? and if it should happen that the officers connect themselves with the Senate, they may mutually support each other, and, for want of efficacy, reduce the power of the President to a mere vapor, in which case his responsibility would be annihilated, and the expectation of it unjust. The high executive officers, joined in cabal with the Senate, would lay the foundation of discord, and end in an assumption of the executive power, only to be removed by a revolution in the government. I believe no principle is more clearly laid down in the Constitution than that of responsibility. After premising this, I will proceed to an investigation of the merits of the question upon constitutional ground.

I have, since the subject was last before the house, examined the Constitution with attention; and I acknowledge that it does not perfectly correspond with the ideas I entertained of it from the first glance. I am inclined to think that a free and systematic interpretation of the plan of government will leave us less at liberty to abate the responsibility than gentlemen imagine. I have already acknowledged that the powers of the government must remain as apportioned by the Constitution. But it may be contended that, where the Constitution is silent, it becomes a subject of legislative discretion. Perhaps, in the opinion of some, an argument in favor of the clause may be successfully brought forward on this ground. I, however, leave it for the present untouched.

By a strict examination of the Constitution on what appear to be its true principles, and considering the great departments of the government in the relation they have to each other, I have my doubts whether we are not absolutely tied down to the construction declared in the bill.

In the 1st section of the 1st article, it is said that all legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States. In the 2d article, it is affirmed that the executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. In the 3d article, it is declared that the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time