Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v3.djvu/587

.] therefore, that treaties and cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and all those concerning foreigners, will not be considered as improper subjects for a federal judiciary. Harmony between the states is no less necessary than harmony between foreign states and the United States. Disputes between them ought, therefore, to be decided by the federal judiciary. Give me leave to state some instances which have actually happened, which prove to me the necessity of the power of deciding controversies between two or more states. The disputes between Connecticut and Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island and Connecticut, have been mentioned. I need not particularize these. Instances have happened in Virginia. There have been disputes respecting boundaries. Under the old government, as well as this, reprisals have been made by Pennsylvania and Virginia on one another. Reprisals have been made by the very judiciary of Pennsylvania on the citizens of Virginia. Their differences concerning their boundaries are not yet perhaps ultimately determined. The legislature of Virginia, in one instance, thought this power right. In the case of Mr. Nathan, they thought the determination of the dispute ought to be out of the state, for fear of partiality.

It is with respect to the rights of territory that the state judiciaries are not competent. If the claimants have a right to the territories claimed, it is the duty of a good government to provide means to put them in possession of them. If there be no remedy, it is the duty of the general government to furnish one.

Cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction cannot, with propriety, be vested in particular state courts. As our national tranquillity and reputation, and intercourse with foreign nations, may be affected by admiralty decisions; as they ought, therefore, to be uniform; and as there can be no uniformity if there be thirteen distinct, independent jurisdictions,—this jurisdiction ought to be in the federal judiciary. On these principles, I conceive the subjects themselves are proper for the federal judiciary.

Although I do not concur with the honorable gentleman that the judiciary is so formidable, yet I candidly admit that there are defects in its construction, among which may be objected too great an extension of jurisdiction. I cannot say, by any means, that its jurisdiction is free from fault,