Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v3.djvu/552

536, to render it more convenient. I think this idea perfectly warrantable. There is an example, within our knowledge, which illustrates it. By the Confederation, Congress have an exclusive right of establishing rules for deciding, in all cases, what captures should be legal, and establishing courts for determining such cases finally. A court was established for that purpose, which was at first stationary. Experience, and the desire of accommodating the decision of this court to the convenience of the citizens of the different parts of America, had this effect—it soon became a regulation that this court should be held in different parts of America, and it was held accordingly. If such a regulation was made, when only the interest of the small number of people who are concerned with captures was affected, will not the public convenience be consulted, when that of a very considerable proportion of the people of America will be concerned? It will be also in the power of Congress to vest this power in the state courts, both inferior and superior. This they will do, when they find the tribunals of the states established on a good footing.

Another example will illustrate this subject further. By the Confederation, Congress are authorized to establish courts for trying piracies and felonies committed on the high seas. Did they multiply courts unnecessarily in this case? No, sir; they invested the admiralty courts of each state with this jurisdiction. Now, sir, if there will be as much sympathy between Congress and the people as now, we may fairly conclude that the federal cognizance will be vested in the local tribunals.

I have observed that gentlemen suppose that the general legislature will do everything mischievous they possibly can, and that they will omit to do every thing good which they are authorized to do. If this were a reasonable supposition, their objections would be good. I consider it reasonable to conclude that they will as readily do their duty as deviate from it; nor do I go on the grounds mentioned by gentlemen on the other side—that we are to place unlimited confidence in them, and expect nothing but the most exalted integrity and sublime virtue. But I go on this great republican principle, that the people will have virtue and intelligence to select men of virtue and wisdom. Is there no virtue among us? If there be not, we are in a wretched