Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v3.djvu/539

.] I have heard that opinion advocated by gentlemen for whose abilities, judgment, and knowledge, I have the highest reverence and respect. I say that the general description of the judiciary involves the most extensive jurisdiction. Its cognizance, in all cases arising under the system and the laws of Congress, may be said to be unlimited. In the next place, it extends to treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority. This is one of the powers which ought to be given them. I also admit that they ought to have judicial cognizance in all cases affecting ambassadors, foreign ministers and consuls, as well as in cases of maritime jurisdiction. There is an additional reason now to give them this last power; because Congress, besides the general powers, are about to get that of regulating commerce with foreign nations. This is a power which existed before, and is a proper subject of federal jurisdiction. The next power of the judiciary is also necessary under some restrictions. Though the decision of controversies to which the United 5tates shall be a party may at first view seem proper, it may, without restraint, be extended to a dangerously oppressive length. The next, with respect to disputes between two or more states, is right. I cannot see the propriety of the next power, in disputes between a state and the citizens of another state. As to controversies between citizens of different states, their power is improper and inadmissible. In disputes between citizens of the same state, claiming lands under the grants of different states, the power is proper. It is the only case in which the federal judiciary ought to have appellate cognizance of disputes between private citizens. Unless this was the case, the suit must be brought and decided in one or the other state, under whose grant the lands are claimed, which would be injurious, as the decision must be consistent with the grant.

The last clause is still more improper. To give them cognizance in disputes between a state and the citizens thereof, is utterly inconsistent with reason or good policy.

Here Mr. NICHOLAS arose, and informed Mr. Mason that his interpretation of this part was not warranted by the words.

Mr. MASON replied, that, if he recollected rightly, the propriety of the power, as explained by him, had been contended for; but that, as his memory had never been