Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v3.djvu/504

488 die, the election of another President will immediately take place; and suppose it would not,—all that Congress could do would be to make an appointment between the expiration of the four years and the last election, and to continue only to such expiration. This can rarely happen. This power continues the government in motion, and is well guarded.

, June 18, 1788.

Mr. MONROE, after a brief exordium, in which he insisted that, on the judicious organization of the executive power, the security of our interest and happiness greatly depended; that, in the construction of this part of the government, we should be cautious in avoiding the defects of other governments; and that our circumspection should be commensurate to the extent of the powers delegated,—proceeded as follows: The President ought to act under the strongest impulses of rewards and punishments, which are the strongest incentives to human actions. There are two ways of securing this point. He ought to depend on the people of America for his appointment and continuance in office; he ought also to be responsible, in an equal degree, to all the states, and to be tried by dispassionate judges; his responsibility ought further to be direct and immediate. Let us consider, in the first place, then, how far he is dependent on the people of America. He is to be elected by electors, in a manner perfectly dissatisfactory to my mind. I believe that he will owe his election, in fact, to the state governments, and not to the people at large. It is to be observed that Congress have it in their power to appoint the time of choosing the electors, and of electing the President. Is it not presumable they will appoint the times of choosing the electors, and electing the President, at a considerable distance from each other, so as to give an opportunity to the electors to form a combination? If they know that such a man as they wish—for instance, the actual President—cannot possibly be elected by a majority of the whole number of electors appointed, yet if they can prevent the election, by such majority, of any one they disapprove of, and if they can procure such a number of votes as will be sufficient to make their favorite one of the five highest on the list, they may ultimately carry the election into the general