Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v3.djvu/323

.] a tax on any given article throughout the United States? It is represented to be oppressive, that the states which have slaves, and make tobacco, should pay taxes on these for federal wants, when other states, which have them not, would escape. But does the Constitution on the. table admit of this? On the contrary, there is a proportion to be laid on each state, according to its population. The most proper articles will be selected in each state. If one article, in any state, should be deficient, it will be laid on another article. Our state is secured on this foundation. Its proportion will be commensurate to its population. This is a constitutional scale, which is an insuperable bar against disproportion, and ought to satisfy all reasonable minds. If the taxes be not uniform, and the representatives of some states contribute to lay a tax of which they bear no proportion, is not this principle reciprocal? Does not the same principle hold in our state government in some degree? It has been found inconvenient to fix on uniform objects of taxation in this state, as the back parts are not circumstanced like the lower parts of the country. In both cases, the reciprocity of the principle will prevent a disposition in one part to oppress the other. My honorable friend seems to suppose that Congress, by the possession of this ultimate power as a penalty, will have as much credit, and will be as able to procure any sums, on any emergency, as if they were possessed of it in the first instance; and that the votes of Congress will be as competent to procure loans as the votes of the British Commons. Would the votes of the British House of Commons have that credit which they now have, if they were liable to be retarded in their operation, and, perhaps, rendered ultimately nugatory, as those of Congress must be by the proposed alternative? When their vote passes, it usually receives the concurrence of the other branch; and it is known that there is sufficient energy in the government to carry it into effect.

But here the votes of Congress are, in the first place, dependent on the compliance of thirteen different bodies, and, after non-compliance, are liable to be opposed and defeated by the jealousy of the states against the exercise of this power, and by the opposition of the people, which may be expected if this power be exercised by Congress after partial compliances. These circumstances being known, Congress could not command one shilling. My honorable friend