Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v3.djvu/315

.] a fair trial. Such a condemnation is repugnant to the principles of justice. It is contrary to the Constitution, and the spirit of the common law. Look at the bill of rights. You find there that no man shall be condemned without being confronted with his accusers and witnesses; that every man has a right to call for evidence in his favor, and, above all, to a speedy trial by an impartial jury of the vicinage, without whose unanimous consent he cannot be found guilty. These principles have not been attended to; an instance has been mentioned already, where they have been in some degree violated.

[Here Mr. Pendleton spoke so very low that he could not be heard.]

My brethren in that department [the judicial] felt great uneasiness in their minds to violate the Constitution by such a law. They have prevented the operation of some unconstitutional acts. Notwithstanding those violations, I rely upon the principles of the government—that it will produce its own reform, by the responsibility resulting from frequent elections. We are finally safe while we preserve the representative character. I made these observations as introductory to the consideration of the paper on. your table. I conceive that, in those respects where our state Constitution has not been disapproved of, objections will not apply against that on our table. When we were forming our state Constitution, we were confined to local circumstances. In forming a government for the Union, we must consider our situation as connected with our neighboring states. We have seen the advantages and blessings of the Union. Every intelligent and patriotic mind must be convinced that it is essential to our happiness. God grant we may never see the disadvantages of disunion!

To come to the great object of direct taxation, more immediately under consideration:—If we find it our interest to be intimately connected with the other twelve states, to establish one common government, and bind in one ligament the strength of thirteen states, we shall find it necessary to delegate powers proportionate to that end; for the delegation of adequate powers in this government is no less necessary than in our state government. To whom do we delegate these powers? To our own representatives. Why should we fear so much greater dangers from our