Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v3.djvu/283

.] idol—that flattering idea—that exotic plant which has been lately imported from the ports of Great Britain, and planted in the luxurious soil of this country.

In the course of the investigation, much praise has been lavished upon the article which fixes the number of representatives. It only says that the proportion shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand.

The worthy gentleman says that the number must be increased, because representation and taxation are in proportion, and that one cannot be increased without increasing the other, nor decreased without decreasing the other. Let us examine the weight of this argument. If the proportion of each state equally and ratably diminishes, the words of the Constitution will be as much satisfied as if it had been increased in the same manner, without any reduction of the taxes. Let us illustrate it familiarly. Virginia has ten representatives; Maryland has six. Virginia will have to pay a sum in proportion, greater than Maryland, as ten to six. Suppose Virginia reduced to five, and Maryland to three. The relative proportion of money, paid by each, will be the same as before; and yet the honorable gentleman said, that, if this did not convince us, he would give up. I am one of those unhappy men who cannot be amused with assertions. A man from the dead might frighten me; but I am sure that he could not convince me without using better arguments than I have yet heard.

The same gentleman showed us that, though the Northern States had a most decided majority against us, yet the increase of population among us would, in the course of years, change it in our favor. A very sound argument indeed, that we should cheerfully burn ourselves to death in hopes of a joyful and happy resurrection!

The very worthy gentleman who presides was pleased to tell us that there was no interference between the legislation of the general government and that of the state legislatures. Pardon me if I show the contrary. In the important instance of taxation there is a palpable interference. Suppose a poll tax: the general government can lay a poll tax; the state legislatures can do the same—can lay it on the same man, and at the same time; and yet it is said there can be no interference.

My honorable colleague in the late federal Convention, in