Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v2.djvu/388

372 which can come only under the cognizance of the judiciary of the United States. Hence it must appear that these powers will affect, in an unlimited manner, the property of the citizens; that they will subject them, in a great degree, to the laws of the Union, and give an extensive jurisdiction to the federal courts. The objects of the amendment are, to prevent excises from being laid on the manufactures of the United States, and to provide that direct taxes shall not be imposed till requisitions have been made and proved fruitless.

All the reasoning of the gentlemen goes to prove that government ought to possess all the resources of a country. But so far as it respects government in general, it does not apply to this question. Giving the principle its full force, it does not prove that our federal government ought to have all the resources; because this government is but a part of a system, the whole of which should possess the means of support. It has been advanced repeatedly by the gentleman, that the powers of the United States should, like their objects, be national and general. It appears to him proper, therefore, that the nature of their resources should be correspondent. Sir, it has been declared that we can no longer place confidence in requisitions. A great deal of argument has been spent on this point. The gentlemen constantly consider the old mode of requisitions, and that proposed, in the same view. But not one of us has ever contended for requisitions in the form prescribed in the existing Confederation: hence the reasoning about the inefficacy of the ancient mode has no application to the one recommended; which rests on different principles, and has a sanction of which the other is totally destitute. In the one instance, it is necessary to execute the requisitions of Congress on the states collectively. There is no way of doing this but by coercing a whole community, which cannot be effected. But the amendment proposes to carry the laws of Congress to the doors of individuals. This circumstance will produce an entire change in the operation of requisitions, and will give them an efficiency which otherwise they could not have. In this view, it will appear that the gentleman's principles respecting the character and effects of requisitions can have no application in this dispute. Much pains has been taken to show that requisitions have not answered the