Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v2.djvu/355

.] reasons for opposite constructions of the same clause. They may heap refinement upon refinement, and subtilty upon subtilty, until they construe away every republican principle, every right sacred and dear to man. I am, sir, for certainty in the establishment of a constitution which is not only to operate upon us, but upon millions yet unborn. I would wish that little or no latitude might be left to the sophistical constructions of men who may be interested in betraying the rights of the people, and elevating themselves upon the ruins of liberty. Sir, it is an object of infinitely too much importance to be committed to the sport of caprice, and the construction of interested men. If we adopt this Constitution, it is impossible, absolutely impossible, to know what we give up, and what we retain. I wish that this may, as far forth as possible, be ascertained; and, for this purpose, it is absolutely necessary that this clause should be amended.

Suppose, however, that the states have concurrent jurisdiction with Congress in taxation; it is evident, as the laws of Congress are the supreme laws of the land, that their taxes, whenever they interfere with the taxes laid by the states, must and will claim a priority as to the collection; in fact, that they may, in order to pass the laws necessary for the end, abolish the state taxes; and that they may constitutionally monopolize every source of revenue, and thus indirectly overturn the state governments; for how can the latter exist without revenue? How can they exist, I say, when they cannot raise one sixpence for their support, without the sovereign will and pleasure of Congress? Let us suppose, however, that both governments have and exercise the right of taxation; will there not be a struggle between them continually? Will there not be jealousies, contentions, and animosities? Every man that knows human nature will answer in the affirmative. Is this, then, a desirable thing? Will it promote the public good, the great end of all government? Sir, the questions admit of easy answers. This must evidently be the result of two taxing powers—either that the people are doubly taxed, or that the state governments are destroyed. Both will be pernicious. There must necessarily be a double set of revenue officers if the first happens, which will be an enormous expense. I know, sir, that these ideas will be considered