Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v1.djvu/400

380 There will be great, important, and valuable offices under this government, should it take place, more than sufficient to enable him to hold out the expectation of one of them to each of the senators. Under these circumstances, will any person conceive it to be difficult for the President always to secure to himself more than one third of that body? Or can it reasonably be believed that a criminal will be convicted, who is constitutionally empowered to bribe his judges, at the head of whom is to preside, on those occasions, the chief justice—which officer, in his original appointment, must be nominated by the President, and will, therefore, probably, be appointed, not so much for his eminence in legal knowledge, and for his integrity, as from favoritism and influence; since the President, knowing that, in case of impeachment, the chief justice is to preside at his trial, will naturally wish to fill that office with a person of whose voice and influence he shall consider himself secure. These are reasons to induce a belief that there will be but little probability of the President ever being either impeached or convicted. But it was also urged that, vested with the powers which the system gives him, and with the influence attendant upon those powers, to him it would be of little consequence whether he was impeached or convicted, since he will be able to set both at defiance. These considerations occasioned a part of the Convention to give a negative to this part of the system establishing the executive as it is now offered for our acceptance.

By the third article, the judicial power of the United States is vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish. These courts, and these only, will have a right to decide upon the laws of the United States, and all questions arising upon their construction, and in a judicial manner to carry those laws into execution; to which the courts, both superior and inferior, of the respective states, and their judges and other magistrates, are rendered incompetent. To the courts of the general government are also confined all cases, in law or equity, arising under the proposed Constitution and treaties made under the authority of the United States—all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls—all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction—all controversies to which the United States are a party—all controversies between two or more states; between citizens of the same state, claiming lands under grants of different states; and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects. Whether, therefore, any laws or regulations of the Congress, any acts of its President or other officers, are contrary to, or not warranted by, the Constitution, rests only with the judges, who are appointed by Congress, to determine; by whose determinations every state must be bound. Should any question arise between a foreign consul and any of the citizens of the United States, however remote from the seat of empire, it is to be heard before the judiciary of the general government, and, in the first instance, to be heard in the Supreme Court, however inconvenient to the parties, and however trifling the subject of dispute.

Should the mariners of an American or foreign vessel, while in any American port, have occasion to sue for their wages, or, in any other instance, a controversy belonging to the admiralty jurisdiction should take place between them and their masters or owners, it is in the courts of the general government the suit must be instituted; and either party may carry it by appeal to its Supreme Court. The injury to commerce, and the oppression to individuals, which may thence arise, need not be enlarged