Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v1.djvu/387

Rh resentatives of the people, but are one of the three estates composing that kingdom, having hereditary rights and privileges, distinct from and independent of the people.

That it may, and probably will, be a future source of dispute and controversy between the two branches, what are, or are not, revenue bills and the more so as they are not defined in the Constitution; which controversies may be difficult to settle, and may become serious in their consequences, there being no power in the Constitution to decide upon, or authorize, in cases of absolute necessity, to terminate them by a prorogation or dissolution of either of the branches—a remedy provided in the British constitution, where the king has that power, which has been found necessary at times to be exercised, in cases of violent dissensions between the Lords and Commons on the subject of money bills.

That every regulation of commerce; every law relative to excises, stamps, the post-office, the imposing of taxes, and their collection; the creation of courts and offices; in fine, every law for the Union, if enforced by any pecuniary sanctions, as they would tend to bring money into the Continental treasury, might, and no doubt would, be considered a revenue act. That consequently the Senate—the members of which will, it may be presumed, be the most select in their choice, and consist of men the most enlightened and of the greatest abilities, who, from the duration of their appointment and the permanency of their body, will probably be best acquainted with the common concerns of the states, and with the means of providing for them—will be rendered almost useless as a part of the legislature; and that they will have but little to do in that capacity except patiently to wait the proceedings of the House of Representatives, and afterwards examine and approve, or propose amendments.

There were also objections to that part of this section which relates to the negative of the President. There were some who thought no good reason could be assigned for giving the President a negative of any kind. Upon the principle of a check to the proceedings of the legislature, it was said to be unnecessary; that the two branches having a control over each other's proceedings, and the Senate being chosen by the state legislatures, and being composed of members from the different states, there would always be a sufficient guard against measures being hastily or rashly adopted—that the President was not likely to have more wisdom or integrity than the senators or any of them; or to better know or consult the interest of the states, than any member of the Senate, so as to be entitled to a negative on that principle; and as to the precedent from the British constitution, (for we were eternally troubled with arguments and precedents from the British government,) it was said it would not apply. The king of Great Britain there composed one of the three estates of the kingdom; he was possessed of rights and privileges as such, distinct from the Lords and Commons—rights and privileges which descended to his heirs, and were inheritable by them; that, for the preservation of these, it was necessary he should have a negative; but that this was not the case with the President of the United States, who was no more than an officer of the government; the sovereignty was not in him, but in the legislature. And it was further urged, even if he was allowed a negative, it ought not to be of so great extent as that given by the system, since his single voice is to countervail the whole of either branch, and any number less than two thirds of the other. However, a majority of the Convention was of a different opinion, and adopted it as it now makes a part of the system.